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I. INTRODUCTION
For more than fifteen years, federal courts have struggled with the
problem of defining the scope of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 19831
where the state defendant is not the immediate cause of harm to the
plaintiff. These indirect harm cases arise in state institutions when
inmates are injured by disease, by other inmates, or by their own
actions; in families subject to state supervision when children are
injured by their biological or foster parents; in schools when pupils
are assaulted by other students; and in a multitude of disparate set-
tings where citizens are attacked by unknown assailants or imperiled
by the forces of nature. Moreover, the increasing involvement of
the government in the lives of its citizens, whether through regula-
tion or through provision of services, has multiplied the contexts in
which indirect harm cases arise.
When plaintiffs seek to litigate these claims in federal court, they
generally allege a violation of their right to substantive due process,
which is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and is therefore actionable under section 1983.2
Since the United States Supreme Court first recognized a constitu-
tional cause of action for harm not directly attributable to the state,3
it has made several efforts to define the contours of liability in this
area. But despite-or perhaps because of-these efforts, the limits
of liability for indirect harm remain confused and controversial. It is
still true, as Justice White observed in considering this particular
1. The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other persons within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in. equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. For purposes of this section, any
Act.of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall
be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). This brief statute is the subject of an enormous body of case
law and scholarly commentary. For an excellent and comprehensive review of this com-
plex area, see SHELDON NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION (3d ed.
1990). See generally PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFI-
CIAL WRONGS 60-77 (1983).
2. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "no state shall.., deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
As is discussed in detail below, a limited class of indirect harm cases are litigated
under the Eighth, rather than the Fourteenth, Amendment. See infra text accompanying
notes 18-26.
3. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976); see infra text accompanying notes
18-26.
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issue ten years ago, that "[n]o problem so perplexes the federal
courts today as determining the outer bounds of Section 1 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. ' '4
My purpose here is to find order amidst the chaos that predomi-
nates in analysis of indirect harm cases. It is my hope that such an
effort will assist courts, scholars, and advocates who continue to be
confronted by these cases, as well as identify a focused agenda for
future commentary, inquiry, and action. I begin in Section I by trac-
ing the development of existing law. While there have been a
number of Supreme Court opinions that have addressed this topic, I
focus on. the three that have proven to be the most important: Estelle
v. Gamble,5 which first recognized liability in this area; Martinez v. Cal-
ifornia,6 which attempted to define the limits of liability; and
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,7 which is the
Supreme Court's most recent effort to constrain the expansion of
liability.8
It is essential to consider these cases together in order to appreci-
ate the context in which the later cases were litigated. In the wake of
Estelle and, subsequently, Martinez, the courts of appeals developed
competing bodies of law governing cases of indirect harm. To un-
derstand the course chosen by the Supreme Court in DeShaney and
to comprehend where it has led and may lead us, we must identify
and understand the alternatives that the Supreme Court faced. We
must consider these alternative paths not only in broad theoretical
terms, but also as concrete and competing tests that had been devel-
oped by the courts of appeals.
In Section II, I offer a review of the current law. Even under the
constraints imposed by DeShaney, courts have recognized many
claims for indirect harm. Two principal lines of analysis have
4. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984) (White, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (quoting City of Joliet v. Jackson, 715 F.2d 1200, 1201 (7th Cir. 1983)).
Section 1983 is the vehicle by which these claims are brought, but the perplexing
problem is actually determining the outer bounds of the due process guarantee
contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1050-51.
5. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
6. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
7. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
8. It is not my intention to critique DeShaney in detail in this Article. The
weaknesses of the opinion and the constricted constitutional jurisprudence that
supports it have been amply reviewed by a number of noted scholars. In addition, some
recent commentary has focused on the application of DeShaney to relatively narrowly
defined topics. See sources cited infra note 108. The broad outlines of liability after
DeShaney remain unexplored and unexplained. My aim here is to place DeShaney in
context, to examine its continuing impact on the entire range of indirect harm cases, to
set forth a framework for analysis of these cases, and to identify an area where reform
might reasonably be sought.
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emerged. Under the first, which focuses on state inaction, liability
turns on whether the plaintiff was in custody. The second, which
focuses on state action, requires examination of the relationships
between the state action, the harm, and the victim. Even the seem-
ingly straightforward inaction/custody analysis has generated a
range of conflicting opinions among the circuits. The second and
more complex analysis has yielded a substantial number of elabo-
rate and often fragmented opinions, but has failed to produce any
coherent view of the rules governing liability.
In Section III, I propose a framework for considering indirect
harm claims that promotes clarity and the recognition of constitu-
tional rights and is also consistent with existing Supreme Court pre-
cedent. My framework divides indirect harm cases into five basic
categories. Although the parties may contest the categorization of a
case, once a case is categorized, the legal analysis should be rela-
tively clear. For cases falling into the first two categories, there are
viable theories of liability. Cases that fall into the third category are
foreclosed by DeShaney's substantive due process analysis. In many
of these cases, liability is both desirable and appropriate. It is in this
area that the law most needs reform. I outline three alternative
routes by which this reform could be accomplished: (1) expansion
of an existing, but presently limited, exception to DeShaney; (2) in-
creased reliance on state law; and (3) adoption of new legislation
specifically crafted to address this problem. 9 The fourth and fifth
categories present their own peculiar problems; liability in these in-
stances is very doubtful.
In the concluding section of this Article, I recapitulate my propos-
als for organizing the legal treatment of claims for indirect harm and
for remedying the most acute deficiency of existing law. In doing
so, I identify a course for future inquiry, exploration, and action.
I use the complex process by which lawyers shape their clients'
stories into narratives, and the ways in which this process is shaped
by-and in turn shapes-the law as a touchstone throughout this
9. See infra text accompanying notes 92-101. It seems unlikely that DeShaney will be
overruled or significantly undermined in the near future, given the shifts in the Court's
composition since DeShaney. The Court appears to have moved ideologically to the right
since the opinion was published. Justices Brennan and Marshall have been replaced by
Justices Souter and Thomas, respectively. Justice Blackmun has recently intimated that
his tenure is limited. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2854 (1992)
(Blackmun,J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part) ("I am 83 years old. I cannot remain on this Court forever .... "). Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun were the dissenters in DeShaney. Even with the
replacement of Justice White by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the DeShaney majority
appears to be well in control of the Court.
[Vol. 62
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Article. '0 Lawyers routinely transform multi-dimensional client sto-
ries into focused narratives that can be told in court." A client's
story can be presented as many cases, some of which may win, while
others will probably lose.' 2 Presenting a successful case depends on
a lawyer's awareness of the multiplicity of possible cases that could
be developed from a client's story, as well as on a refined under-
standing of the law.' 3 The evolution of the law from Estelle through
DeShaney to our present circumstances did not happen overnight,
nor is it attributable to the forces of nature. Law does not develop
by chance. Thus, throughout this Article, I explore the dynamics
that shaped the litigation that shaped the law.
10. The Article's focus on this process is at least in part attributable to my own
experience as a civil rights litigator. I have engaged in this process of translation and
transformation in countless cases. In hindsight, I see this as a much more complex and
problematic process than it appeared to me at the time. It is also the focus of thought-
provoking scholarship, See sources cited infra note 11.
11. The process by which lawyers translate their clients' stories into legal cases and
the troubling implications and ramifications of that process is the subject of much
current scholarship. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconciling Poverty Law Practice: Learning
Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YAL LJ. 2107 (1991) [hereinafter Alfieri, Learning Lessons];
Anthony V. Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn: The Story ofJosephine V., 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
619 (1991); Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text, Towards
an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992) [hereinafter
Cunningham, Lawyer as Translator]; Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking
About Law as Language, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1989); William L. F. Felstiner & Austin
Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer/Client Interactions,
77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447 (1992); Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The
Critical Practice and Theory of Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L. J. 861
(1992); Gerald P. Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a
Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1605 (1989); Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the
Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
535 (1987-88); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday Shoes:
Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990) [hereinafter White, Sunday Shoes];
see also JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUsTICE AS TRANSLATION 257-69 (1990).
12. More accurately, there may be several winning cases and several losing cases
contained in any client's story. Further, I do not mean to suggest that simply by
selecting a particular version of the story, the lawyer determines whether she will win or
lose. The lawyer's choice of story, however, may dramatically alter the chances of
success.
13. A lawyer must also recognize which stories will have the power to move a judge
and/or jury and which will not. Thus, a litigator must also have an awareness of the
persuasive power of different versions of the story. For works exploring the manner and
ethics of persuasion, see JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow 3-27, 215-37 (1985);
Joseph W. Singer, Persuasion, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2442 (1989); Paul T. Wangerin, A
Multidisciplinary Analysis of the Structure of Persuasive Arguments, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
195 (1993); James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and
Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684 (1985).
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II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
As noted above, the cases that raise the problem with which I am
concerned arise in a wide variety of factual settings-in prisons, in
hospitals, in schools, in families, and in all of the more ordinary set-
tings of everyday life. Yet while they involve widely varying and
often curious facts, they share a significant common trait. Unlike
more traditional section 1983 claims, where the immediate cause of
the harm is the state action giving rise to the complaint, in these
cases the most immediate cause of the harm is independent of the
state. Instead of claiming that an officer of the state used unreason-
able force against the plaintiff or directly deprived the plaintiff of a
constitutionally protected property interest without due process,
these plaintiffs allege that they were injured by an intervening third
party, by external conditions, or. even by their own actions.' 4 Never-
theless, they assert that the state bears legal responsibility for the
indirect harm. Given this common and defining characteristic of the
cases with which I am concerned, I call them "indirect harm" cases.
Although this denomination is both apt and useful, it is worth not-
ing that it has not always been the most commonly used. Particu-
larly during the early development of litigation in this area-from
1976 to 1987-plaintiffs generally contended that by virtue of the
Constitution, and particularly the Fourteenth Amendment, the state
had a duty to protect them from harm caused by sources independ-
ent of the state. Naturally enough, courts and commentators often
framed the issue in these cases as whether there was a "duty to
protect."15
14. For example, in Joshua DeShaney's case the immediate cause of his harm was his
father, who was certainly not a state actor. In other cases, the injury to the plaintiff was
immediately caused by unknown assailants, by disease or injury, by fire, or-in perhaps
the most startling cases-by the plaintiff's own suicidal actions.
15. See, e.g., Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding
that plaintiff stated civil rights claim when agency returned abused child to mother and
child later died of abuse; agency did not adequately investigate situation to which it
returned child); Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that social
service agencies alleged to have violated children's civil rights by failing to protect them
were entitled to good faith immunity where, at time of the alleged violation,
constitutional right of affirmative protection was not clearly established); White v.
Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding duty of protection in state and
local agencies where persons were not in custody; court reversed dismissal of claim that
alleged that police subjected children passengers to "health-endangering situation" by
abandoning them); Julie Shapiro, Litigating Duty to Protect Cases, in 3 CIVIL RIGHTS
LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY FEES ANNUAL HANDBOOK 53 (Jules Lobel & Barbara Wolvovitz
eds., 1987); Lisa E. Heinzerling, Comment, Actionable Inaction: Section 1983 Liability for
Failure to Act, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1048 (1986).
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The shift from "duty to protect" to "indirect harm" represents
more than a change in taxonomy.1 6 While some duty-to-protect
cases highlighted the actions of the state, generally the cases were
presented as claims challenging state inaction. Most courts analyzed
them as claims that the state had a duty to act and failed to act. The
common question these cases raised was: When did the Constitu-
tion mandate that the state take action, so that inaction itself became
actionable? 7
As I discuss below, the identification--or perhaps, in hindsight,
misidentification-of indirect harm cases as duty-to-protect cases
had a profound impact on the current shape of the law in this area.
It is the Supreme Court's broad rejection of liability based on an
asserted duty to protect in DeShaney that has most dramatically de-
fined current law. At the same time, from the perspective of an
outside observer, this identification-an identification in part ac-
complished by plaintiff's attorneys-must seem perverse, for it is
widely recognized that the Anglo-American legal tradition is gener-
ally hostile to claims based on assertions of inaction. In. order to
understand this paradoxical development, it is necessary to retrace
the development of this line of cases, beginning with the first
Supreme Court opinion that recognized constitutional liability for
indirect harm in 1976.
A. Estelle v. Gamble
In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional
claim of J.W. Gamble, a convicted prisoner who alleged that the
state had failed to provide him with proper medical care, thereby
16. Duty-to-piotect cases are, in fact, a subset of indirect harm cases, comprised of
those indirect harm cases in which the plaintiff (or the court) is relying on a particular
theory of liability similar to that enunciated in DeShaney. All indirect harm cases could be
conceptualized as duty-to-protect cases. I will show, however, that indirect harm cases
can also be conceptualized in other ways. See infra text accompanying notes 47-48, 145-
232.
I use "duty to protect" to identify those cases premised on the theory of liability
advanced by the plaintiffs in DeShaney-that the state, because of its inaction, should be
liable for failing to protect an individual. I use "indirect harm" to identify the general
category of cases with which I am concerned. .
17. I do not mean to suggest that there is a sharp distinction between action and
inaction. Before DeShaney, however, indirect harm cases were usually litigated as cases
of inaction, and DeShaney and many other opinions rely on a distinction between action
and inaction. Once a case is conceptualized as a duty-to-protect case, it is necessarily
focused on the state's failure to act to fulfill that duty. The plaintiffs in DeShaney did not
contest this designation; instead, they voluntarily assumed it and argued that inaction
was, under their circumstances, actionable. See infra text accompanying notes 78-92.
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subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment.'8 The Court con-
cluded that the Constitution is violated-and that liability can be im-
posed-when a state actor manifests "deliberate indifference to a
prisoner's serious illness or injury."' 9 The grounding for this deci-
sion, which was relatively noncontroversial at the time20 and re-
mains so even today,2 ' was the Eighth Amendment.2 2 The Court
reasoned that a prisoner is obliged to rely on the state for medical
care, that failure to provide medical care might result in unnecessary
pain and suffering, and that unnecessary pain and suffering consti-
tutes cruel and unusual punishment, which is expressly forbidden by
the Eighth Amendment.23 In order to fulfill the commands of the
Eighth Amendment, the state is affirmatively obligated to provide
medical care to prisoners, at least under certain circumstances. 24 In
other words, given the particular relationship (custodial) between
the individual and the state, there is a constitutional duty on the part
of the state to provide medical care to protect a prisoner against
18. 429 U.S. 97, 101, 104-05 (1976). The Court rejected Gamble's claim against the
particular doctor, but upheld the basic theory of the claim and remanded to the court of
appeals for further consideration of whether a cause of action had been stated against
other prison officials. See id. at 106-08.
19. Id. at 105.
20. Contemporary commentators did not question Estelle's grounding of the right to
prison medical care in the Eighth Amendment. Estelle was seen, however, as a
broadening of prisoners' rights. This was consistent with the trends established in the
federal circuit courts and in the Supreme Court at the time. The only commentators
who considered Estelle controversial expressed concern that the requirement of
deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials would prove to be a major obstacle
to practical relief. See, e.g., Emily Calhoun, The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Rights of
Prisoners: A Reappraisal, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q 219, 244-46 (1977) (stating that Estelle
represents broadening of constitutional rights to prisoners, but then erects substantial
barriers in form of requirements for physical pain and subjective intent of prison
officials); Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 771-72
(1978) (stating that Estelle represents sub rosa recognition of government's interest in
controlling costs in formulating constitutional standards and criticizing the decision for
limiting government's affirmative duties to narrow context (prison), while articulating
high standard (deliberate indifference) that creates no practical obligation on states to
improve prison facilities); Eric Neisser, Is There a Doctor in the Joint? The Search for
Constitutional Standards for Prison Health Care, 63 VA. L. REV. 921, 922 (1977) (asserting
that Court's amorphous constitutional standard of "deliberate indifference" is product
of both limits of historical treatment of Eighth Amendment and fear of creating
constitutional tort of medical malpractice, as well as suggesting that meaningful
standard requires closer scrutiny).
21. See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993) (affirming, through a seven-
member majority, essential principles of Estelle). But see id. at 2483-85 (Thomas, Scalia,
JJ., dissenting) (strongly suggesting that Estelle is incorrect and should be overruled).
22. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. The Eighth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that
"cruel and unusual punishment [shall not be] inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
23. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-05.
24. Id.
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unnecessary suffering caused by disease or injury.2 5 In short, Estelle
recognized that the Eighth Amendment imposes, at least in some
cases, an affirmative duty to protect upon the states. Liability in any
particular case is predicated on the state's inaction; that is, its failure
to protect the individual in its custody from harm.
In the litigation that followed, plaintiffs' lawyers sought to expand
Estelle's holding in two different directions. First, it was apparent
that if the Eighth Amendment requires some protection against in-
juries caused by untreated injury or disease, it might also require
protection against harms occasioned by other independent sources.
Suffering caused by deliberate indifference to personal safety, for
example, was indistinguishable from suffering caused by disease.
Holdings soon established that, at least in some instances, prisoners
could maintain actions for deliberate indifference to threats to their
safety.2 6 This extension of Estelle was relatively unproblematic and
was limited to those individuals who could invoke the Eighth
Amendment.
The second direction in which Estelle expanded ultimately proved
to be far more troublesome. If the state had a duty to provide medi-
cal care to individuals who were in state custody because they had
been convicted of crimes, it seemed unreasonable not to impose a
similar duty to provide care for individuals who were in state cus-
tody awaiting trial. To illustrate, suppose there were two prisoners
with identical physical needs sharing a cell, one proven guilty and
the other a pretrial detainee presumed to be innocent. A rule of law
that required medical attention for the convicted prisoner, but not
for the innocent detainee, was unacceptable. The only acceptable
legal conclusion was that the pretrial detainee had to have at least
the same rights to medical care as the convict. 27 The question for
25. See id.
26. See, e.g., Davis v. Zahradnick, 600 F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1979) (assault by guard);
Goodman v. Parwatikar, 570 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1978) (assault by fellow mental patients
or staff). A number of courts have recognized that this encompasses threats posed by
the prisoner himself. Thus, a viable cause of action can be stated for deliberate
indifference to the possibility of suicide or other self-inflicted injuries. See, e.g., Elliot v.
Cheshire County, 940 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that father of detainee who
committed suicide could state cause of action against correction officials ifjail personnel
knew or reasonably should have known of detainee's suicidal tendencies); Buffington v.
Baltimore County, 913 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that state may have affirmative
due process obligation to prevent detainee from committing suicide, even though
detention was at request of family members and not the result of any criminal violation).
27. Indeed, it was arguable that the pretrial detainee had greater rights than the
convicted prisoner. The Supreme Court has not resolved this question. Although most
courts acknowledge that they are operating under the Fourteenth Amendment, many
appellate opinions use Eighth Amendment standards for cases involving pretrial
detainees. See, e.g., Davis v. Hall, 992 F.2d 151, 153 (8th Cir. 1993) ("In the absence of a
1994]
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the court would be not so much what conclusion should be reached
in this instance, but rather by what reasoning the conclusion should
be reached.
One possible approach would have been to apply the Eighth
Amendment to prisoners generally. This possibility, however, was
quickly foreclosed. During the same term that Estelle was decided,
the Supreme Court limited the application of the Eighth Amend-
ment. In Ingraham v. Wright, the Court rejected a claim that the
Eighth Amendment applies to schoolchildren subjected to corporal
punishment. 28 The Court found that schoolchildren and prisoners
stand in "wholly different circumstances, separated by the harsh
facts of criminal conviction and incarceration." 2 9 The Court contin-
ued that "Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the
State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally
associated with criminal prosecutions. °30 Two years later, the Court
confirmed what Ingraham had strongly suggested: the Eighth
Amendment does not apply to pretrial detainees, either. In Bell v.
Wolfish, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment guarantees be-
come relevant only after criminal prosecution and conviction. 3'
Having eliminated the Eighth Amendment as the source of the
constitutional duty to protect citizens held in custody but not con-
victed of any crime, the Court was left with little alternative but to
invoke the relatively flexible terms of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Youngberg v. Romeo32 and City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hos-
pital,33 the Court recognized that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment imposes an affirmative duty on states to
protect people in their custody from harm.
Romeo, in which the Court recognized a constitutional right to
protection in the Fourteenth Amendment, had far reaching conse-
quences. Nicholas Romeo was a profoundly retarded adult who had
been involuntarily committed to a state hospital when he could no
clearly established standard for pretrial detainees' claims of inadequate medical care, we
apply the deliberate indifference standard in the analysis of this case."); Garcia v. Salt
Lake County, 768 F.2d 302, 307 (10th Cir. 1985) (assuming, without deciding, that
rights of pretrial detainees under Fourteenth Amendment are same as prisoners under
Eighth Amendment); see also Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941, 949 n.6 (4th Cir. 1987)
("[T]he 'deliberate indifference standard' is applicable to pretrial detainees under the
Fourteenth Amendment.").
28. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
29. Id. at 669 (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 671 n.40 (citing United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317-18 (1946)).
31. 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979).
32. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
33. 463 U.S. 239 (1983) (holding that city is liable for medical services rendered to
suspect injured by police when they tried to apprehend him).
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longer be cared for at home.3 4 Romeo was injured on a number of
occasions while he was institutionalized, both by his own violence
and that of other residents. 35 He sued the state, alleging, inter alia,
that it had breached its duty to protect him from himself and from
others and had violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 6 A unanimous Supreme Court agreed. In accepting Ro-
meo's claim that the state had a duty to protect him from danger, it
reasoned that "[i]f it is cruel and unusual punishment to hold con-
victed criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to
confine the involuntarily committed-who may not be punished at
all-in unsafe conditions."3 7 While the conclusion is clearly sound,
the opinion provides no analysis of how the right originally
grounded in the Eighth Amendment could also be derived from the
Due Process Clause. Further, it does not provide any basis for un-
derstanding the dimensions of the right protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Recognition of an affirmative obligation to act arising under the
Fourteenth Amendment opened new possibilities. Even before Bell
v. Wolfish, it was clear that the Eighth Amendment was of limited
scope because it prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. It had been
relatively easy for the Court to limit its application to those con-
victed of a crime. By contrast, application of the Fourteenth
Amendment could be argued in a vast array of circumstances.
There was no obvious cut-off point. There was no historical or doc-
trinal reason why a right founded on the Fourteenth Amendment
should apply only to those in custody. By careful analogy, litigators
could argue that the relationship between their clients and the state
was enough like that between Nicholas Romeo and the state that
their clients too had a right to protection. Cases asserting a duty to
protect outside of custodial settings thus began to appear.
B. Martinez v. California and the Rise of the Duty to Protect
Four years after Estelle, Martinez v. California was decided. 38 At the
time, the case was not associated with Estelle, and the Court and
counsel approached the question of liability from an entirely differ-
ent direction.
34. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 309.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 310.
37. Id. at 315-16.
38. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
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Mary Ellen Martinez was a fifteen-year-old girl murdered by a
recklessly released parolee.39 Her family sued the state officials who
had decided to parole him.40 In addition to a state-law claim that
failed because of a statutory grant of immunity, the plaintiffs
presented a section 1983 claim that the decedent was deprived of
life in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4' The plaintiffs'
principal constitutional theory was not that the state was obliged to
protect Martinez and failed to do so, but rather that the action of the
state in releasing the parolee caused the harm suffered and there-
fore deprived the victim of life without due process of law.42
The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' due process claim.
The Court found that the victim's death was "too remote a conse-
quence of the parole officers' action to hold them responsible under
federal civil rights law."143 Whether, as a matter of state tort law, the
defendants owed the victim any duty or proximately caused the
harm was deemed irrelevant for the purpose of assessing the consti-
tutional claim. Instead, the Court specifically identified several fac-
tors that contributed or combined to lead to the plaintiffs' failure to
state a claim: the victim was not murdered until five months after
the parolee's release, the parole board was not aware of any particu-
lar danger to the victim-as opposed to the public generally-and
the parolee was in no sense an agent of the parole board.44 These
factors supported the Court's conclusion that the harm was too at-
tenuated under the facts alleged.
Even as it rejected the plaintiffs' claim, the Court left open the
possibility of liability under different facts. It suggested that under
the Fourteenth Amendment the state could, given the right circum-
stances, be liable to a plaintiff not in custody for harm that was not
directly caused by a state actor.45 This, of course, was consistent
with the contemporaneous developments in the Estelle line of cases.
Because, however, the Court had rejected reliance on state law gov-
39. Id. at 279. The victim is unnamed in the Supreme Court's opinion. Thus, she is
hardly a powerful figure in the Court's narrative account of the case.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 279, 283.
42. Id. at 283-84.
43. Id. at 285.
44. Id. (citing, for comparison purposes, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1973),
which had held that immunity of officers of executive branch of state government for
their acts is not absolute, but qualified and of varying degree, depending upon scope of
discretion and responsibilities of particular office and circumstances existing at time
challenged action was taken).
45. Id. Specifically, the Court stated: "We need not and do not decide that a parole
officer could never be deemed to 'deprive' someone of life by action taken in connection
with the release of a prisoner on parole." Id.
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erning duty and causation, the terms of this liability would have to
be determined on the basis of some body of federal common law.46
1. Martinez and Estelle Together
No connection was drawn between Martinez and Estelle at the time
Martinez was litigated. Estelle is not cited in the petitioners' briefs
before the Supreme Court or in the Supreme Court's opinion. 47
Upon examination, however, it is clear that Martinez and Estelle rep-
resent two possible approaches to the same problem. The common
concern is the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to claims
for indirect harm. Estelle and Martinez frame and analyze this prob-
lem in two different ways: Estelle as a problem of state inaction, and
Martinez as a problem of state action.
Estelle focused on a relatively narrow frame of reference, limited in
time to the period shortly before the harm occurred and limited in
space to the immediate setting of the injury. The narrative began
with Gamble already in prison. In that narrow frame of reference,
there was no explicit state action. Instead, there was the state's con-
sistent inaction in the face of Gamble's complaints. The problem
was described as one concerning an untreated injury that the state
ignored. The basis of liability is the state's inaction.
By contrast, Martinez employed a much broader frame of refer-
ence. The narrative began five months before the murder-at the
parole board's meeting where the defendants decided to release the
parolee. In that frame of reference, there is state action-the deci-
sion to release the prisoner-and so the case assumed a more tradi-
tional cast. The relevant inquiry was whether the action, in some
meaningful sense, caused the right kind of harm.
It is easy to re-conceptualize Estelle as an action case or Martinez as
an inaction one. In Estelle, we could widen the time frame to extend
to the state's action in incarcerating the prisoner, thereby cutting
him off from all other sources of aid. The plaintiff could then argue
46. At least two different readings of the Court's dismissal of state law principles of
duty and causation are plausible. It could be understood as a direction to federal courts
to develop their own principles of duty or causation, a new branch of federal common
law. It could also be interpreted more generally as a direction that analyses based on
concepts of duty and causation are inappropriate and that the correct approach is to
focus on whether the state could be fairly said to have "deprived" the plaintiff of life or
liberty. Ultimately, it has proved difficult for courts attempting to consider the meaning
of "deprived" to avoid using the language of causation and duty.
47. It is cited in the appellees' brief in support of the state's argument that Estelle
required proof of deliberate indifference, rather than simply a deviation from
professional judgment, to establish liability under § 1983 liability. Brief for Appellees at
64-65, Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) (No. 78-1268).
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that this action indirectly caused the harm.48 Similarly, in Martinez,
we could narrow the focus to the time period immediately preceding
the attack upon the plaintiff. Because no state action is apparent in
that time frame, the plaintiff would have to argue that there was lia-
bility because the state had an obligation to take action to protect
Martinez and that it failed to fulfill that obligation. Thus, Estelle and
Martinez exemplify alternative approaches to the same problem: the
problem of constitutional liability for indirect harm.
2. From Martinez and Estelle to DeShaney
As indirect harm cases were litigated through the late 1970s and
into the early and mid-1980s, lawyers and judges had to choose be-
tween these two approaches as they shaped their narratives and de-
termined the law. The initial choices were made by the lawyers-
typically the plaintiff's lawyer. 49 Defense attorneys developed com-
peting theories governing duty-to-protect cases in order to respond
to plaintiffs.
As a practical matter, in many cases there may have been no real
choice. If a case concerned an escaped or paroled prisoner, it was
virtually inevitable that it would be analyzed under Martinez. If it
concerned aprisoner in state custody, Estelle would be the control-
ling precedent. 50 It was the cases that were not precisely like either
Estelle or Martinez-cases that involved plaintiffs who were more
closely involved with the state than Mary Ellen Martinez, but not as
closely as J.W. Gamble-that presented an opportunity for a real
choice. Frequently one or the other option seemed more natural,
usually because the factual analogy between one of the precedents
and the potential case was more immediately apparent. But, to a
large extent, it was the way that the lawyers shaped their narratives
that determined which option seemed more appropriate. It is here
48. This is precisely how Justice Rehnquist reinterpreted Estelle in the Court's
subsequent opinion in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, as he
sought to demonstrate that prior opinions supported liability only in cases of state
action. 489 U.S. 189, 198-200 (1989); see also infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
It is not, however, consistent with the original analysis in Estelle.
49. Of course, it may not have been initially apparent to all lawyers and judges that
there were two different approaches from which to choose. Their choices may not
always have been conscious ones.
50. While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(e)(2) provides that it is permissible to
litigate on the basis of alternative theories, it is very difficult to do so in practice, or at
least not beyond a certain point. A number of complaints undoubtedly included
allegations both that the state failed to protect the plaintiff and that the state's action
harmed the plaintiff. For presentation to a jury or to a judge, and often even at an early
stage of litigation, the plaintiff's attorney must be able identify and isolate the conduct
that is deemed to be blameworthy.
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that an understanding of the process by which litigation evolves be-
comes crucial.
a. The Process of Litigation
A plaintiff's lawyer seeking relief for a client may need to develop
new theories of recovery, but she does not simply craft a legal the-
ory or construct a case out of thin air. She begins with two ele-
ments-the story her client tells her and the existing legal
precedents. Through the litigation process, a lawyer shapes and de-
velops a client's story to construct a complex narrative-a version of
the plaintiff's story that entitles the plaintiff to recovery under ex-
isting, or possibly new, law. In constructing this narrative, she must
use the tools at hand to fashion her cases into a form that, in her
estimation, is a faithful translation of the client's story, is consistent
with the client's wishes, and has a reasonable-if not the best possi-
ble-chance of success in a court of law. 5'
This requires the intricate exercise of professional judgment, cre-
ativity, and persuasion. Many factors shape the construction of legal
cases from clients' stories. First, it is, of course, the client's story.
The extent to which the lawyer can or should alter that story must
depend in large part on the client's desire or willingness to have her
story altered. 52 Beyond that, there are many technical issues that
constrain the lawyer's craft. For example, although each client's
story may be retold in a variety of different ways, the ways in which it
can be told in a court are more limited. A lawyer ultimately must be
prepared to prove her client's case and, hence, is constrained by the
evidence available and by the rules governing admissibility of evi-
dence. Some versions of the narrative-versions a lawyer may judge
to be highly effective-may be unprovable and therefore cannot be
told in court.
5 1. This cursory description is a vast over-simplification of a complex process that is
crucial to the operation of our legal system. Recently, scholars have turned their
attention to this process. Many have found it problematic. See sources cited supra note
11.
52. In practice, many lawyers may pay inadequate attention to the wishes of their
clients in their efforts to construct a winning case. Even where lawyers are sensitive to
the problems present in the attorney/client relationship, the lawyer's role as translator
may nevertheless alter the client's story in ways that can be troubling. See Alfieri,
Learning Lessons, supra note 11, at 2111; Cunningham, Lawyer as Translator, supra note 11,
at 1301 n.12; Gilkerson, supra note 11, at 872; White, Sunday Shoes, supra note 11, at 8. At
the same time, in my own experience, some clients are willing and even eager to have
their stories transformed, or at least parts of their stories transformed, if it will make it
more likely that their cases will be successful. See Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on
the Theoretics of Practice, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 971, 984-85 (1992).
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Even after the client has been consulted and the available evi-
dence has been identified, the lawyer still faces a multiplicity of
choices about the narrative she wants to present. At this point, she
may consider such diverse factors as the strength of various wit-
nesses and/or the narrative force and coherence of competing ver-
sions of the story in making the choices that result in the production
of a single story.
Throughout this process of constructing the narrative that might
eventually be presented to the judge or jury, an advocate must be
concerned not only with the development of the facts, but also with
the relationship between the facts and the law. 53 The existing
framework of legal analysis dictates that some versions of the case
have a greater chance of success than others. For lawyers pursuing
claims which we may now recognize as indirect harm cases, Estelle
and Martinez were the most influential precedents. Predicting the
application of these precedents to their cases guided lawyers in
shaping and forming their claims. 54
53. See Gilkerson, supra note 11, at 911-14.
54. All of these choices take place within the particular process of litigation. The
first formal stage of the litigation is the filing of the complaint, which is merely "a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint serves two different functions in the development of the
narrative. First, it sets out the essentials of the plaintiff's story. Second, it provides the
raw material from which richer and more complex narratives will be constructed by both
parties.
The complaint itself is rarely, if ever, a compelling narrative. The rules of pleading
and good pleading practice are at odds with the techniques of effective storytelling. For
example, the Rules require that "[elach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise
and direct." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(l). The Rules also strongly suggest (and sound
practice generally dictates) that each paragraph of a pleading should contain only one
fact. See FED. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Similarly, each paragraph (i.e., each sentence) of a
pleading must fairly stand alone so that it can be admitted or denied. Additionally,
pleadings cannot contain language considered to be impertinent or scandalous. FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(0. Because few lawyers are capable of producing the simple yet powerful
prose of a Hemingway, a well-drafted complaint is often dry, unemotional, and over-
simplified. It does, however, constitute a basic presentation of the plaintiff's story.
In the course of civil litigation, each side develops a series of more complex
narratives, all leading toward one that may eventually be presented to a jury or a judge.
These narratives appear in briefs under the heading "Facts of the Case" and are often
presented in opening and closing statements. At the earliest stages of the litigation,
these narratives are based entirely on the complaint. In contesting a motion to dismiss,
for example, both the plaintiff and the defendant must construct narratives drawn only
from the allegations of the complaint. Typically, these bare facts support two distinctly
different narratives. The same phenomena may occur at summary judgment. Each side
works, at least in large part, with the same uncontested facts; from those same facts,
however, each side constructs its own narrative. The process of litigation is one of
constantly refining, reforming, and retelling stories, with ultimately the judge deciding
whether a case proceeds and on what theories it may be grounded.
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In the years after Estelle, many section 1983 indirect harm cases
were not governed by clearly established Supreme Court precedent.
On the developing edge of the law, judges were largely free to rule
for plaintiffs or for defendants. 55 But the general approach of their
analyses, like those of the lawyers, was essentially determined by the
preceding cases. For the participants in the litigation of indirect
harm cases, lawyers and judges alike, the form of their arguments
and the controlling analogies were determined in large part by the
starting points of the line of cases-Estelle and Martinez.
In reviewing the results of the earliest indirect harm caies, it is
apparent that cases modeled on Estelle met with greater success than
those patterned on Martinez,56 although this success was by no
means uniform. 57 The underlying assertion that a failure' to act
55. Many § 1983 defendants, including those in indirect harm claims, raise a
qualified immunity defense. Qualified immunity defeats an otherwise valid § 1983 claim
where the governing law was not clearly established at the time of the underlying
actions. See David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial
Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23 (1989).
For a time, the absence of any clearly established law threatened to halt the
development of law in this area because of the approach to the qualified immunity
defense utilized in some circuits. Until 1991, some courts evaded the need to resolve
novel constitutional questions presented in § 1983 cases by reasoning that, even
assuming the existence of any constitutional right, it was certainly not a clearly
established right and, hence, the defendant was entitled to prevail on the basis of
qualified immunity. This allowed the court to dismiss the case without deciding its
merits. The constitutional right at issue was no more clearly established at the end of
the case than it had been at the beginning. This could have continued indefinitely and
no additional rights would ever become clearly established. In 1991, however, the
Supreme Court specifically disapproved this decisional process and directed the lower
courts to decide the substantive questions of liability before the qualified immunity
questions. Siegert v. Gilley, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 1793 (1991). It is regrettable that despite
the Supreme Court's direction, some courts persist in deciding cases on qualified
immunity grounds instead of determining whether a constitutional claim is presented.
See, e.g., Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1993); Walton v. City of
Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding no clearly established right without
deciding whether there was any violation of the Constitution); Hilliard v. City & County
of Denver, 930 F.2d 1516, 1519 (10th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 656 (1991).
56. See, e.g., Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985);Jensen
v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984); Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1983)
(dismissing plaintiff's § 1983 claim against parole officers who knew that felon had
violated parole, but allowed him to remain free, reasoning that felon's acts of violence
against plaintiff did not constitute deprivation of due process); Doe v. New York City
Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981) (using deliberate indifference
standard of Estelle, holding that placement agency's nonperformance of duties was
sufficient to give rise to § 1983 cause of action); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th
Cir. 1979); Wagar v. Hasenkrug, 486 F. Supp. 47 (D. Mont. 1980) (denying defendant's
motion to dismiss where plaintiff's decedent, found by police wandering streets in
intoxicated state, was not taken into custody, but instead left outside under tree).
57. See Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding no
§ 1983 liability where undercover officers failed to intervene in bar-room fight that
developed into shootout in which innocent bystander was killed).
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could be actionable-that under some circumstances the Constitu-
tion gave rise to an affirmative duty to protect-was widely ac-
cepted.58 The questions in duty-to-protect cases focused on
whether the circumstances alleged were the right sort of circum-
stances and, if they were, whether the defendants acted with the req-
uisite state of mind.59 As an increasing body of cases articulating
the right sort of circumstances developed, it became easier for plain-
tiffs to find supportive precedents. Lawyers developing cases could
draw on these precedents to guide them in shaping and forming
their claims.
Plaintiffs whose cases rested on facts that bore an obvious resem-
blance to Martinez-that is, those most likely to focus on action-
fared far worse. Virtually all of them were unsuccessful. 60 Given a
variety of fact patterns, the courts of appeals consistently concluded
that the state action was too attenuated from the harm. Precedents
supporting imposition of liability for indirect harm in cases where
the plaintiff alleged that the blameworthy conduct was action-
rather than inaction-were few and far between. A plaintiff who
chose to relate a narrative of action rather than inaction would be
58. See, e.g., id. at 268; Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978); Wagar,
486 F. Supp. at 53.
59. See infra note 141.
60. See, e.g., Janan v. Trammell, 785 F.2d 557 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding no liability
where defendants failed to reincarcerate parolee after he committed various parole
violations and before he killed plaintiff's decedent);Jones v. Phyfer, 761 F.2d 642 (1 1th
Cir. 1985) (finding no liability where defendants released a criminal on furlough who
subsequently raped plaintiff, whose home he had broken into on several prior
occasions); Wright v. City of Ozark, 715 F.2d 1513 (11 th Cir. 1983) (finding no liability
where plaintiff was raped by unknown assailant, despite allegation that defendants were
aware of other rapes in same area and suppressed information); Fox, 712 F.2d at 84
(finding no liability where defendants failed to supervise and re-incarcerate parolee who
was released April 12 and committed various crimes known to defendants before crime
against plaintiffs on May 14); Humann v. Wilson, 696 F.2d 783 (10th Cir. 1983) (finding
no liability where plaintiff was raped by inmate after his transfer to corrections facility
that allowed inmate greater freedom); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982)
(finding no liability where defendants released mental patient who, one year later,
murdered plaintiff's decedent). But see Nishiyama v. Dickson County, 814 F.2d 277 (6th
Cir. 1987) (en banc). In Nishiyama, the plaintiffs' decedent was murdered by a prisoner
who was allowed to drive a fully equipped police car back to the jail after dropping a
deputy off at his home. Id. at 279. Instead of returning to jail, the prisoner used the
police car to pull over citizens driving in the area. Id. After this conduct had been
reported to the local officials, who took no action, he pulled over and killed Nishiyama.
Id. Even on these seemingly extraordinary facts, the trial judge dismissed the complaint,
holding that the harm was too attenuated from the state's action. Id. The complaint was
reinstated, but only by a 7-6 vote of the en banc Sixth Circuit, which reasoned that the
state's acting in supplying the equipment needed to commit the crime provided a basis
for distinguishing Martinez. Id. at 281.
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forced to distinguish many precedents and would find little support
in previously decided cases.
Taken together, the lesson of the appellate cases was fairly clear:
those cases that were litigated like Estelle-that focused on inaction
and a duty to protect-were more likely to be successful than those
that were litigated like Martinez. At least the plaintiff could point to
precedents that supported liability. It is improbable that the lesson
was lost on litigators. Surely lawyers prefer to litigate where there
are supportive precedents, and thus the chances of success are
greatest. Therefore, plaintiffs' attorneys would prefer cases that
bore a resemblance to Estelle and Romeo rather than to Martinez. And
in litigating cases that were not obviously like Estelle or Martinez, but
that bore the potential of resembling either, they were likely to de-
velop their cases so that they resembled Estelle rather than Martinez.
Perhaps this is speculative. Certainly it is counterintuitive, given
the Anglo-American tradition of hostility to assertions of liability
based on a failure to act. But, in fact, the reported cases employed
the analysis and language of Estelle, emphasizing the failure of the
state to take some action and the relationship between the plaintiff
and the state, perhaps comparing it to custodial relationships.
Plaintiffs consistently structured their narratives around an assertion
of state inaction, and the results in these cases increasingly turned
on the question of whether, under the particular circumstances
presented, there was an affirmative duty to act. Cases patterned on
the assertions of action that characterized Martinez virtually vanished
from the field.
This is not to say that Martinez had no utility as a precedent. Mar-
tinez was employed to support the contention that the duty to act
was not limited to prisoners. Additionally, it was employed to iden-
tify some factors that were arguably relevant to the determination of
whether a duty to act existed. As is noted above, the circumstances
giving rise to Martinez and Estelle are two different variants of the
same problem-the problem of indirect harm. Initially the cases
presented very different approaches to this problem, but over time
this changed. In discussing Martinez and Estelle, courts gradually
lost sight of the distinction that Martinez conceptualized: the prob-
lem as one of an action giving rise to the harm, while Estelle spoke of
a failure to act that caused the harm. All indirect harm cases came
to be seen as duty-to-protect cases, where the crucial question was
whether the state had an affirmative obligation to act.
Martinez and Estelle could both have been portrayed as either state
action or state inaction cases. Perhaps because Estelle preceded Mar-
tinez in time, or perhaps because plaintiffs' lawyers pressed develop-
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ment of Estelle-like cases and eschewed the Martinez arguments,
Martinez became an inaction case. 61 The prevalent form of analysis
in indirect harm cases-by then seen to be duty-to-protect cases-
focused on the relationship between the plaintiff and the state and
the claim that the relationship gave rise to an affirmative duty to act
on the part of the state. Courts viewed the facts of each new case
through this lens, characterizing plaintiffs' claims as ones for entitle-
ment to protection and characterizing government conduct as inac-
tion, even where the plaintiff had presented the case in other
terms.62
b. Divergent Paths
In time, two divergent strands of appellate case law governing
duty-to-protect claims developed. 63 The more expansive analysis,
typified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit's approach in Estate of Bailey v. County of York,6 recognized the
existence of affirmative duties where there was a "special relation-
ship" 65 between the state and the plaintiff. In defining what consti-
tuted a "special relationship," the Third Circuit drew on language
61. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298,
302 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Martinez as authority for "the fact that state inaction might be
deemed a proximate cause of the... injury under evolving common law notions"), aft'd,
498 U.S. 189 (1989).
62. For instance, the plaintiff's claim in Wright was that the police had suppressed
information about earlier rapes in the area. Wright, 715 F.2d at 1513. Thus, it was not a
complaint of inaction, but rather one of action. The court noted the basis of the
complaint, but analyzed the case as a duty-to-protect claim, using the inaction
framework. Id. The court noted that the Constitution does not, absent a special
relationship, oblige the state to take action and affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's
complaint. Id. at 1515.
63. The analysis of the process of litigation included above helps explain why judges
and lawyers came to conceptualize indirect harm cases as inaction cases that raised
questions about the scope of an affirmative duty to protect. See supra text accompanying
notes 51-62. It does not, however, explain why particular courts answered the questions
raised in particular ways in particular cases. Neither does it suggest what answers courts
should have reached. These issues are beyond the scope of this Article. My primary
concern is to explore how and why the law arrived at particular formulations of the
critical issues and how these formulations continue to affect legal doctrine today. For
extensive discussions of the normative questions raised by the indirect harm cases, see
Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271 (1990); see also
Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984).
64. 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985).
65. Id. at 510-11. "Special relationship" is terminology borrowed from the
Restatement of Torts. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAw OF TORTS § 56, at 373-85 (5th ed. 1984). It serves as a label for those
circumstances under which an affirmative duty would be recognized. Thus, virtually all
courts would agree that where there was a special relationship, there was an affirmative
duty. The more significant question was when should a court find a special relationship
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from Martinez and from other circuit court opinions. 66 Judge
Sloviter recognized that the existence of a special relationship that
gave rise to a duty to protect could exist in the absence of custody. 67
The additional factors to be considered included "whether the state
had expressly stated its desire to provide protection to a particular
class or specific individuals; and whether the state knew of the vic-
tim's plight."68 Applying this test in Bailey, the Third Circuit deter-
mined that a "special relationship" existed between a child abused
by her mother and the social services agency that was aware of the
abuse. 69 Given this special relationship, the social services agency's
failure to act was a proper basis for liability.
By contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit led the way in developing a series of approaches, all of which
were more restrictive. 70 Again, it is critical to note that, consist-
ently, the question posed was whether and when the state could be
held liable for inaction. The Seventh Circuit was particularly hostile
to claims based on inaction. It made much of the distinction be-
tween action and inaction, sharply limiting liability for inaction to
narrowly defined circumstances. 7' Various panels described these
circumstances in different ways. One panel, for example, deter-
mined that "[t]he state must protect those it throws into snake pits,
but the state need not guarantee that volunteer snake charmers will
not be bitten." 72 An en banc opinion endorsed liability only when
the state monopolized a means of rescue or assistance, as it did in
existed. As discussed in the text, the Third Circuit identified specific factors that were to
be used in determining whether a special relationship existed.
66. The court particularly relied on: Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984);
Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1983); and Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social
Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981). Bailey, 768 F.2d at 508-11.
67. Bailey, 768 F.2d at 508-11.
68. Id. at 509.
69. Id. at 508-09.
70. See Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding no duty of prison to
protect prison guards, who voluntarily exposed themselves to known danger, from
injury or death from rioting inmates); Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443 (7th Cir. 1984)
(finding no duty of city to provide elementary protective services such as fire
protection); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983); Bowers v. DeVito,
686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982). But see White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
71. For the Seventh Circuit, it was crucial that "[t]he Constitution is a charter of
negative liberties; it tells the state to let people alone; it does not require the federal
government or the state to provide services, even so elementary a service as maintaining
law and order." Bowers, 686 F.2d at 618; see David P. Currie, Positive and Negative
Constitutional Rights, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 864 (1986); see also Jackson, 715 F.2d at 1200. For
a more extensive discussion of Jakson, see infra text accompanying notes 188-96.
72. Walker, 791 F.2d at 511. This explained why prisoners were entitled to claim a
duty to protect, while prison guards were not.
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prison.73 A concurring judge suggested that there should be liabil-
ity only where the state created the danger.7 4 But while there might
have been fewer circumstances under which the state had a duty to
act under the Seventh Circuit's analysis, Judge Posner still conceded
that there were instances where such a duty did exist. 75
Before turning to the DeShaney litigation, it is important to reiter-
ate that the competing strands in the circuit courts reflected a com-
mon assumption that what was at issue in cases concerning indirect
harm was the existence of an affirmative duty. In that sense, the vast
majority of the cases were rooted in the concepts and analysis of
Estelle--of the state's affirmative duty to protect-rather than in
terms of Martinez. They were generally understood to be cases
about inaction, not action.
Finally, of course, the distinction between action and inaction is
relativistic, depending on the point of view of the observer. Clever
advocates can transform action to inaction and back again. The line
between an affirmative duty to act-to protect another-and a duty
to refrain from acting so as to endanger, is based on the same dis-
tinction between action and inaction and is similarly manipulable.
Nevertheless, the characterization of conduct as action or inaction
was and is important. The same circumstances may be treated dif-
ferently, depending on how the claim arising from those circum-
stances is described. It is my contention that the development of
the case law after Estelle and Martinez and before DeShaney shaped the
terms of the debate in a particular way. Cases of indirect harm-
which could have been action cases-became inaction cases. They
were seen as duty-to-protect cases, and the predominant claim was
that the state had an affirmative obligation to protect various plain-
tiffs. While this claim was, and remains, viable in certain contexts-
for example, prison-it was bound to fail at some point. The Anglo-
73. Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1222 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (finding
no duty of city rescue dispatcher to provide rescue services unless dispatcher increased
risk of harm). The en banc opinion was issued while DeShaney was pending in the
Supreme Court and provided the appellate judges of that court with one last
opportunity to present their analysis of the problem to the Justices. See id. at 1215,
1221.
74. Id. at 1226 (Posner, J., concurring). Judge Posner suggested that the crucial
factor might be whether the state placed the victim in a position of danger in the first
place, or whether it merely enhanced a danger that already faced the victim, through no
initial fault of the government. Id. If, as he concluded was the case in Archie, the state
merely enhanced a pre-existing danger, it was under no obligation to act and its inaction
was not actionable. Id. Judge Posner's proposed test does not conform to accepted
legal precepts. Under his test, the person needing medical care at the time of his or her
incarceration would not have to be provided with medical care because the state would
not have created the initial need for care.
75. White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
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American legal tradition would not support the unlimited imposi-
tion of affirmative duties. 76 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department
of Social Services,77 the Supreme Court's most recent opinion in the
area, turned out to be that point.
C. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department
of Social Services
The facts of DeShaney, as presented by the plaintiffs, closely paral-
leled those of Estate of Bailey v. County of York, which was successfully
litigated in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
According to the allegations of the complaint, the plaintiff, four-
year-old Joshua DeShaney, had been repeatedly abused by his father
over an extended period of time. The Winnebago County Depart-
ment of Social Services (DSS) had been alerted and had taken on the
case. DSS had expressed its willingness to intervene. 78 Months
before the critical injuries were inflicted, DSS had temporarily
placed Joshua in the custody of a hospital, but three days later had
returned him to his father's custody. 79 The social workers, named
as individual defendants in the litigation, assertedly became aware
of the abuse and yet did nothing, except to note the ever-mounting
evidence of abuse in their records. Ultimately, Joshua's father in-
flicted terrible injuries upon him. DSS and the individual public de-
fendants had failed to protect Joshua DeShaney.
This was the crux of the case. The plaintiffs80 consistently por-
trayed their case as one about inaction-about the failure to protect.
The plaintiffs did not allege that Joshua was worse off or more vul-
nerable because of the actions of the state. They did not attempt to
prove that someone would have tried to rescue Joshua but for the
intervention of DSS.81 It was not alleged that at the time DSS re-
76. The Anglo-American legal tradition is consistently hostile to claims that one was
required to take action on behalf of another. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 314 (1965).
77. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
78. Complaint at 17-24, reproduced in Joint App. at 1-2, DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (No. 87-154).
79. Id. at 9 25-26.
80. The plaintiffs were Joshua DeShaney and his mother, Melody DeShaney.
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 299 (7th Cir.
1987), aff'd, 498 U.S. 189 (1989).
81. The Complaint did contain allegations thatJoshua's mother, Melody, would have
intervened on his behalf had she been aware of the conditions of Joshua's life with his
father. Complaint at 30. The theory presented, however, was apparently that the
defendants failed to tell her of Joshua's abuse, rather than that they in any way
prevented her from acting on her own. This is a failing that could readily be
characterized as inaction.
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turned Joshua to his father's custody, it was aware of the father's
abusive conduct. It was not alleged that the state created the danger
to Joshua. Consistent with their choice of theory of liability, the
plaintiffs developed a record that focused on the defendants' aware-
ness of the harms caused by Joshua's father, Randy DeShaney, and
on the defendants' failure to take any action to prevent the harms.
The central contested issue in DeShaney was whether the public
defendants had a constitutional obligation to act under the circum-
stances presented. Given the course of litigation preceding
DeShaney, this is not surprising. As I have outlined above, cases of
indirect harm were, in general, conceptualized as cases concerning
the state's failure to act. All courts agreed that, under some circum-
stances, the failure to act was a proper basis for liability.8 2 The
struggle lay in defining those circumstances. Several circuits had
held, or at least suggested, that Joshua DeShaney's circumstances
were such as to warrant liability.8 3 Even the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had allowed claims by recipients of
state services alleging that their harm was caused by state inaction.
By contrast, there were few models or precedents for an analysis
that focused on the state's action.
In the district court, in the appellate court, and again in the
Supreme Court, the DeShaney plaintiffs urged the adoption of the
"special relationship" test from Estate of Bailey.84 They lost before
each court that considered their claim.
The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment. It concluded that DeShaney's case was "not sufficiently
similar" to other cases from the Seventh Circuit in which an affirma-
tive duty to act had been imposed.8 5 It explicitly rejected the plain-
tiffs' suggestion that it adopt the Third Circuit's test from Bailey.86
The court of appeals, in an opinion by Judge Posner, affirmed the
district court.8 7 It found the plaintiffs' claims "foreclosed by the
rule, well established in this circuit, that the state's failure to protect
people from private violence, or other mishaps not attributable to
82. See supra text accompanying notes 63-75.
83. See Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985); Jensen v.
Conrad, 747 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1984); Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649
F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
84. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197-98
(1989); DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 303-04.
85. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., C.A. No. 85-C-310, at
"13-*18 (E.D. Wis. June 20, 1986) (petition for writ of certiorari No. 87-154, LEXIS,
Genfed Library, Briefs File).
86. Id. at *17.
87. DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 298.
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the conduct of its employees is not a deprivation of constitutionally
protected property or liberty."' 8 Consistent with the district court,
the circuit court also refused to adopt the Third Circuit's "special
relationship" test and, instead, specifically rejected it.89 The court
concluded that the state had a duty to act only in specific and limited
circumstances, such as those where the state places the victim in a
position of high risk.90
In the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs continued to urge adoption
of the Third Circuit's test from Bailey. Eschewing any claim for gen-
eral protective services, the plaintiffs instead characterized the rule
that they sought as a narrow one, applying only in limited circum-
stances that were defined by the special relationship test. In those
limited circumstances, they asserted, the state could be held liable
for failing to act to protect an individual.9 1 The plaintiffs did not
argue before the Supreme Court that Joshua was in a worse position
because of any of the conduct of the defendants than he would have
been had DSS not existed. They had not developed a record that
would support that conclusion.92 Although the plaintiffs stressed
88. Id. at 301. The court also offered a second rationale for rejecting the plaintiffs'
claim. It concluded that the state conduct, even if blameworthy, did not cause Joshua's
injuries and that therefore it could not be said to have deprived him of his liberty
interest. Id. at 302. Writing for the court, Judge Posner concluded that any increase in
the probability that Joshua would be harmed attributable to the state's conduct was
"trivial." He bolstered his conclusion by pointing out that if DSS had not existed,
Joshua would "almost certainly" have suffered the same injuries. Id. Citing Jackson v.
City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983), as authority, he stated: "[A] merely
conjectural possibility that the state's inaction warned off other rescuers is not enough
to make the state complicit (in a federal constitutional sense) in the private conduct that
caused the victim's injury." DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 301. In short, the state conduct
complained of was too remote from the harm, and imposition of liability was
inappropriate.
The introduction of this reasoning is significant in light of developments after
DeShaney. See infra text accompanying notes 194-98. But it is also important to note that
there was indeed, no evidence of record that the existence and action of DSS increased
the probability of harm to Joshua DeShaney. While it is possible that this is because
there was no such evidence to be had, it may instead simply reflect the plaintiffs' theory
of the case. Plaintiffs did not argue that the state increased the probability of harm to
Joshua and, hence, would have had no reason to produce any evidence to that effect. See
DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 301.
89. DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 303.
90. Id. at 302 (citing White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979), as an instance
of such conduct).
91. Brief for Petitioners at 12-13, DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social
Servs., 389 U.S. 189 (1989) (No. 87-154).
92. The plaintiffs' litigation choices must be evaluated in the context in which they
made them. The benefits of hindsight make the choice of litigation strategies much
easier to criticize. And perhaps Joshua DeShaney's case could not have been won before
the Supreme Court at that time, no matter what arguments had been used. In any event,
when the plaintiffs were actually litigating their case in the district court, no court had
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that the state had been actively involved in Joshua DeShaney's
case-a prerequisite of the Bailey test-they did not contend that
their case was therefore one arising from state action.
Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Supreme Court, re-
jecting the DeShaneys' claim. The majority held that "the State had
no constitutional duty to protect Joshua." 93 Rehnquist character-
ized the plaintiffs' claim as one that the state should be held liable
for "failing to intervene to protect him against a risk of violence at
his father's hands."'94 This was essentially consistent with the plain-
tiffs' own characterization of their claim. 95 The Court rebuffed the
plaintiffs' call for adoption of the special relationship test96 and
stated that a state's failure to protect an individual against private
violence "simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process
Clause." 97
In a dramatic shift, the Court recast Estelle and Romeo as cases
where it was the state's action-taking a person into custody and
thereby depriving him of the ability to help himself-that gave rise
to the affirmative obligation to act on the part of the state. 98 The
Court distinguished DeShaney's position-he was not in state cus-
tody, but was rather in the custody of his father. 99 Additionally,
"While the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua
faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it
do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them."' 0 0 Echo-
ing the Seventh Circuit, the Court continued that even when the
state took temporary custody of Joshua and then returned him to
the custody of his father, "it placed him in no worse position than
that in which he would have been had it not acted at all."''°
utilized a test that focused on whether the plaintiff was worse off than she would have
been otherwise. By the time DeShaney reached the Supreme Court, there were two
opinions that suggested such an analysis-the Seventh Circuit's opinions in DeShaney
itself and its en banc opinion in Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1222-23 (7th
Cir. 1988). See supra notes 73-74.
93. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 389 U.S. 189, 201
(1989).
94. Id. at 193.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 78-84.
96. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197 n.4.
97. Id. at 202. The Court did not rule out the possibility of a claim under the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. at 197 n.3.
98. Id. at 199.200.
99. Id. at 201.
100. Id.
101. Id. The Court noted that the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit had advanced an alternative reason for rejecting the plaintiffs' claim, but did not
address the failure of causation argument directly. See supra note 88. The plaintiffs had
not addressed the alternative ground in their briefs. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
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The majority's opinion in DeShaney generated dissents by Justices
Brennan102 and Blackmun.' 03 Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Blackmun and Marshall, contended that the majority had mis-
characterized the case as one about the general obligation of the
state to care for its citizens.10 4 It was more appropriate to consider
the actions that were taken by the state in the case-including the
establishment of a child protective services agency. Brennan dis-
agreed with the view that there was no state action in the case. After
summarizing the facts of the case, he noted that "the state actively
intervened in Joshua's life .... "105 In any event, labeling the con-
duct "action" or "inaction" should not be determinative: "[I]f a
state cuts off private sources of aid and then refuses aid itself, it
cannot wash its hands of the harm that results from its inaction."' 0 6
Justice Blackmun also rejected the view that the case was about inac-
tion and the "formalistic reasoning" that led the Court to believe
that action and inaction can be sharply distinguished. 10 7
Perhaps the result in DeShaney was inevitable. That specific court
at that specific time might have decided against Joshua DeShaney no
matter what legal arguments were offered to support his claim.
More subtly, once Estelle was decided, the evolution of the duty-to-
protect cases, in part propelled by plaintiffs' lawyers, was set in mo-
tion. At some point, the limits of analogy would be reached. The
plaintiff in a pending claim would be too far removed from custody,
the case too unlike Estelle, and the court would draw the line. It
would do so in the terms of Estelle-in terms of custody. It did so in
DeShaney.
As is to be expected of a major Supreme Court decision, DeShaney
occasioned a substantial body of commentary. The vast majority of
it is critical of the Court's attempt to draw a sharp distinction be-
tween action and inaction and to limit the state's liability to cases of
action. 108 With the passage of time, the flow of articles and notes
102. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 204 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 210 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 207 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
108. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 63, at 2288-89; Jack M. Beerman, Administrative Failure
and Local Democracy: The Politics of DeShaney, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1078, 1083-96; Karen M.
Blum, Monell, DeShaney and Zinermon: Official Policy, Affirmative Duty, Established State
Procedure and Local Government Liability Under Section 1983, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 23-32
(1990); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative
Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409 (1990); Martha Minow, Words and the
Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665,
1666-78 (1990); Laura Oren, DeShaney's Unfinished Business: The Foster Child's Due Process
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has diminished, but it has not abated. 10 9 Most of the commentary
attacks the foundations of DeShaney-its core value judgments, its
formalistic reasoning, and its reliance on the distinction between ac-
tion and inaction. These commentators offer a competing-and, in
my judgment, a better-view of the world and an alternative legal
analysis. These might someday be adopted by a different court writ-
ing a different opinion. But they offer little assistance for those who
must live-and litigate-in the practical realms of the post-DeShaney
world."t 0 Regardless of its merit, or lack thereof, DeShaney is a
Supreme Court precedent that will be with us for some time to
come. My purpose here is to consider how we can live in the post-
DeShaney world.
III. PRESENT DOCTRINE
It seems likely that the Supreme Court intended DeShaney to be a
definitive precedent-one that resolved the persistent problem of
the indirect harm cases. Yet, as is frequently the case, in many cases
the problem remains unresolved. Multiple readings of DeShaney and
multiple approaches to the problem persist. I I ' A review of the case
Right to Safety, 69 N.C. L. REV. 113 (1990) [hereinafter Oren, Unfinished Business]; Laura
Oren, The State's Failure to Protect Children and Substantive Due Process: DeShaney in Context,
68 N.C. L. REV. 659 (1990); Amy Sinden, In Search of Affirmative Duties Towards Children
Under a Post-DeShaney Constitution, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 227 (1990); Aviam Soifer, Moral
Ambition, Formalism, and the "Free World" of DeShaney, 57 Geo. WASH. L. REV. 1513
(1989); David A. Strauss, Due Process, Government Inaction, and Private Wrongs, 1989 Sup.
CT. REV. 53; Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can
Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1989); Mark Levine, Comment, The Need
for the "Special Relationship" Doctrine in the Child Protection Context: DeShaney v. Winnebago
County, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 329 (1990).
109. E.g., Thomas Eaton & Michael Wells, Governmental Inaction as a Constitutional Tort:
DeShaney and Its Aftermath, 66 WASH. L. REV. 107 (1991); Steven J. Heyman, The First
Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507
(1991); Alan R. Madry, State Action and the Obligation of the States to Prevent Private Harm:
The Circumstances Transformation and the Betrayal of Fundamental Commitments, 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 781 (1992); Christopher Barr, Note, The Duty of Public Schools to Protect Students from
Other Students Under 42 U.S.C. § 1883-D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical
School, 66 TEMPLE L. REV. 1063 (1993); Lynne Jodi Stern, Comment, Young Lives
Betrayed: DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 25 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 1251 (1991).
110. This may be true in part because the major commentators tended to characterize
DeShaney in sweeping and bleak terms. This strengthened their position that the case
was important, of far-reaching significance, and wrong. At the same time, most of the
student notes examined the impact of DeShaney on highly particularized and narrow
situations-children in foster care, individuals living in community-based mental health
facilities, etc.
111. Andrews v. Wilkins, 934 F.2d 1267, 1270-71 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting that law
was not clearly established and holding that (1) police, as state officers, had no
constitutional duty to rescue decedent, and (2) government officials did not violate
decedent's constitutional rights when they interfered with private efforts to rescue
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law following DeShaney illustrates the possible readings of DeShaney
and the different results they yield.
At least two viable and competing lines of analysis remain. First,
there are those opinions that focus on inaction-that consider the
critical question to be whether the state is under a duty to protect
the plaintiff. 1 2 DeShaney most clearly governs these cases. In order
to prevail, in the view of most courts, a plaintiff in a post-DeShaney
duty-to-protect case must demonstrate that she was in custody., 3
decedent because police enlisted private aid to begin with); McComb v. Wambaugh, 934
F.2d 474, 478-83 (3d Cir. 1991) ("The distinction between harm inflicted by a state
agent and injury caused by a private individual is critical .... [Diefendant [foster care
agencies] did nothing, and by inaction made it possible for the mother to harm her
son.... That inaction ... [is] within the scope of DeShaney's holding."); Harris v. District
of Columbia, 932 F.2d 10, 13-16 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that law was not clearly
established and, regardless of possible state-imposed tort law obligations to provide
police protection, police officers are likely under no constitutional obligation to obtain
medical care for overdose victim taken into custody for purpose of obtaining medical
care and not for law enforcement purposes, even if they know of victim's need for
protection); Hilliard v. City & County of Denver, 930 F.2d 1516, 1520-21 (10th Cir.)
(holding that law was not clearly established at time of incident in 1988 that state had
constitutional obligation to protect victim of violence, where police impounded car in
which victim had been a passenger, left her in high crime area, and she was subsequently
robbed and raped), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 656 (1991); Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52,
55 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that DeShaney leaves unclear "how large a role the state must
play in the creation of the danger and in the creation of the vulnerability before it
assumes a corresponding duty to protect"). The Freeman court noted that a
constitutional duty to protect an individual against private violence may arise absent
state custody of that individual. Id. at 55; see also Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d
1510, 1521 n.19 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that government has constitutional obligation
to protect individuals from danger of police officer declared mentally unfit for duty,
where the city has both played part in creating danger-by training and arming officer-
and rendered public more vulnerable to danger by allowing officer to retain his weapon
after mental instability was discovered and after his duties were suspended).
112. Sometimes, plaintiffs cast their own cases in this light and sometimes they are
cast that way by the defense; in any event, this is the approach that the court accepts.
113. There is one exception to this rule. A number of courts have held that a police
officer has an affirmative duty to intercede to protect an individual whose constitutional
rights are being violated by other police officers. See, e.g., McHenry v. Chadwick, 896
F.2d 184, 188 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that corrections officer's failure to intervene
when fellow officers physically assaulted inmate was a violation of inmate's § 1983
rights); O'Neill v. Krzeminski, 839 F.2d 9, 11-12 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that although
officer had no realistic opportunity to prevent fellow officer's initial blows, after seeing
plaintiff beaten, officer had affirmative duty to protect plaintiff from further abuse); Byrd
v. Clark, 783 F.2d 1002, 1007 (11 th Cir. 1986) ("If a police officer.., fails or refuses to
intervene when a constitutional violation ... takes place in his presence, the officer is
directly liable under Section 1983."); Webb v. Hiykel, 713 F.2d 405, 408 (8th Cir. 1983)
(holding that officer was under duty to prevent use of force against inmate even if those
responsible for such force were officer's superiors); Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir.
1972) ("[O]ne who is given the badge of authority of a police officer may not ignore the
duty imposed by his office and fail to stop other officers who punish a third person in his
presence."); Masel v. Barrett, 707 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1989) (noting that all circuits
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Otherwise, DeShaney demands dismissal of the action.1 4 "Custody"
is not, however, a bright-line rule. 51 5 Courts have divided over what
the essential features of custody are and why these features give rise
to a duty to protect."t 6 There is an ongoing debate over the con-
tours of a doctrine of "functional custody."" t 7 Some courts have
declined to find any duty to protect individuals who are voluntarily
committed to state custody, finding that the distinction between vol-
untary restraint and involuntary restraint justifies different treat-
recognize that police officer in special relationship with victim has constitutionally
derived duty to protect victim from constitutional violations by other police officers).
114. Some courts continue to invoke a "special relationship" test. "Special
relationship" describes those circumstances under which the state has an affirmative
duty to protect. See, e.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 700 (9th Cir.
1990) (outlining four-prong test to determine whether special relationship exists).
"Special relationship," however, is no longer defined in the flexible and expansive
manner utilized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Bailey. It
is now essentially limited to custody situations. But see Swader v. Commonwealth, 743 F.
Supp. 434 (E.D. Va. 1990) (employing flexible special relationship test); Eaton & Wells,
supra note 109, at 147-59.
115. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429
U.S. 492 (1977).
116. Uncertainty over why custody should give rise to a duty to protect leads to the
confusion over what the essential features of custody are, for purposes of imposing a
duty to protect on the defendant. If custody gives rise to a duty to protect because the
individual is placed in a dangerous situation by the state, then other instances where the
individual is placed in a dangerous situation should also give rise to a duty, whether or
not we think of them as custody. See discussion infra part III.B. 1. If, on the other hand,
custody gives rise to a duty to protect because an individual in custody is cut off from
other sources of aid or protection and from self help, then other instances where the
state cuts an individual off from sources of assistance should also give rise to a duty. See
discussion infra part III.B.2.
117. The phrase apparently originates in Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist.
(Stoneking I), 856 F.2d 594, 601 (3d Cir. 1988), vacated sub nom. Smith v. Stoneking, 489
U.S. 1062 (1989), reinstated on other grounds, Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist.
(Stoneking II), 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990).
For an interesting custody analysis, see Horton v. Flenory, 889 F.2d 454, 457-58 (3d
Cir. 1989). In Horton, plaintiff's decedent was being brutally interrogated by his private
employer when the police arrived. Id. at 456. The police took no action, but left the
victim in the "good hands" of the employer, who was a former police officer and well-
known to them. Id. at 457. The victim subsequently died of injuries sustained after the
police departed. The court upheld liability, concluding that because the police used
their "official status to confirm" that the employer was free to continue the custodial,
and eventually, fatal, interrogation, the victim was in state custody at the time of the fatal
beating and therefore the police officers had an obligation to protect him. Id. at 458.
On the basis of the active, rather than the passive, state actor, DeShaney was
distinguished. Id. This conclusion that the victim was in state custody seems
particularly strained. A more satisfactory route to the same result, clearly supported by
the evidence in the case, would have been to find a conspiracy between the employer
and the police. On this premise, the co-conspirators, public and private alike, could
have been held liable.
1994] SNAKE PITS
ment. "' Other courts have determined that children placed in an
abusive foster home are in a position analogous to that of a prisoner
and, hence, may pursue duty-to-protect claims, even where the im-
mediate cause of injury is a nonstate actor." 19 The status of stu-
dents, whose attendance at school is compelled by state compulsory
education laws, has been litigated to various conclusions.' 20 Thus,
118. Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that
retarded student voluntarily placed in state custody was not entitled to duty to protect);
Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., 961 F.2d 987, 991 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding no
affirmative act by state where individual in custody was voluntarily committed);
Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for Children, 921 F.2d 459, 465-66 (3d Cir. 1990)
(finding no affirmative act by state where parents voluntarily committed son); Wilson v.
Formigoni, 832 F. Supp. 1152 (N.D. I11. 1993) (finding that while patient was technically
voluntarily committed, commitment was de facto involuntary and therefore had basis for
claim for protection); Ridlin v. Four County Counseling Ctr., 809 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D.
Ind. 1992) (holding that student voluntarily placed in state custody was not entitled to
duty to protect); Halderman v. Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp., 784 F. Supp. 215 (E.D. Pa.)
(finding that though some patients were not technically involuntarily committed,
patients were effectively involuntarily committed because had no choice), aff'd without
opinion, 977 F.2d 568 (3d Cir. 1992). But see McNamara v. Dukakis, No. 90-1261 l-Z,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17565 (D. Mass. Dec. 27, 1990) (considering range of categories
from involuntarily committed to out-patient treatment and concluding that some and
perhaps all voluntarily committed patients are owed duty, as are those placed in state-
supervised community residences).
Halderman and Wilson also demonstrate that what constitutes "involuntary"
commitment may be open to debate. See Wilson, 832 F. Supp. at 1152; Halderman, 784 F.
Supp. at 215.
119. Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 891-94 (10th
Cir. 1992); K.H. e rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 848-50 (7th Cir. 1990); Meador
v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 867
(1990); Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 795-97 (11th Cir. 1987) (en
banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989). Here, too, a question may arise of whether the
children were placed in foster care voluntarily or not. See Milburn v. Anne Arundel
County Dep't of Social Servs., 871 F.2d 474, 476 (4th Cir. 1989). There are also pre-
DeShaney cases that continue to be cited for this proposition. See, e.g., Doe v. New York
City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Michael B. Mushlin,
Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster Children from Abuse and Neglect,
23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 199 (1988) (arguing that foster children are dependent on
state for their needs just as prisoners are and therefore have constitutional right to
safety); Oren, Unfinished Business, supra note 108, at 133- 40; Sinden, supra note 96, at 245-
58.
120. Compare Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 147 (5th Cir. 1992)
(student in functional custody), cert. denied sub nom. Caplinger v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 1066
(1993), reh'g granted en banc, 987 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993); Stoneking I, 856 F.2d at 601
(same); Robert G. v. Newburgh City, No. 89 Civ. 2978, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1990) (same); and Pagano ex rel. Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Schs., 714
F. Supp. 641, 643 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (same) with Dorothy]., 7 F,3d at 732 (students not in
functional custody); D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch.,
972 F.2d 1364, 1371-73 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (same), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045
(1993); J.O. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272-73 (7th Cir.
1990) (same); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(same); Russell v. Fannin County Sch. Dist., 784 F. Supp. 1576, 1582-83 (N.D. Ga.)
(same), aft'd, 981 F.2d 1263 (11 th Cir. 1992).
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even in the area most clearly controlled by DeShaney, there is no
clear understanding of when liability can be established.' 2 1 If
DeShaney was an attempt to clarify the law regarding indirect harm
and restrict future litigation, it must be considered a failure.12 2
A second major line of analysis has also emerged. It is utilized in
opinions that focus on some state action, as opposed to state inac-
tion. These cases are neither viewed nor analyzed as duty-to-pro-
tect cases. Instead, courts critically examine the relationship
between the state action, the victim, and the eventual harm. In do-
ing so, courts rely on the Supreme Court's observations in DeShaney
that "[w]hile the State may have been aware of the dangers that
Joshua faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation,
nor did it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to
them"'123 and that the state's conduct "placed [Joshua] in no worse
position than that in which he would have been had it not acted at
all."' 24 These observations clearly suggest that if these conditions
were not met, a different conclusion might be reached. 125 Thus,
In cases involving injury to schoolchildren where the assailant is a school employee,
plaintiffs typically rely on alternative theories of liability. In addition to an indirect harm
theory, plaintiffs also argue that supervisory defendants or school boards are liable
under the principles of Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978),
for failing to supervise employees or for adopting policies of indifference to the rights of
the schoolchildren. The most striking example of the use of alternative theories is the
Stoneking litigation. In Stoneking I, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit ruled for the plaintiff on an indirect harm theory. The case was decided shortly
before DeShaney. After DeShaney, the Supreme Court remanded Stoneking to the circuit
court for reconsideration in light of DeShaney. The Third Circuit affirmed its initial
conclusion, this time on a supervisory liability theory. Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch.
Dist. (Stoneking II), 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990). Use
of these alternative theories has grown more prevalent since Stoneking. See, e.g., Black v.
Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707, 709 (3d Cir. 1993); C.M. v. Southeast Delco Sch.
Dist., 828 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
121. See, e.g., Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 534 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding no
clearly established law and concluding that "[t]he parameters of what constitutes a
special relationship ... are hazy and indistinct").
122. A number of recent opinions continue to focus on whether a "special
relationship" existed between the plaintiff and defendant. As it is presently used, a
"special relationship" is nothing more than the label for the type of relationship that
gives rise to an affirmative duty to act. Since DeShaney, this generally means some type of
custodial relationship. See, e.g., Black, 985 F'2d at 713; Doe, 975 F.2d at 145-46. The
"special relationship test" devised by the Third Circuit in Bailey is no longer used.
Indeed, the Third Circuit concluded that DeShaney overruled Bailey. Philadelphia Police
and Fire Ass'n for Handicapped Children v. City of Philadelphia, 874 F.2d 156, 167 (3d
Cir. 1989).
123. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201
(1989).
124. Id.
125. Some courts have been unwilling to permit liability under this reading of
DeShaney, asserting that it would "convert most torts by state actors into constitutional
violations." Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., 961 F.2d 987, 993 (1st Cir. 1992).
1994] SNAKE PITS
DeShaney supports liability where the action of the state created the
danger, rendered the plaintiff more vulnerable to a danger, or
placed the plaintiff in a worse position than she would have been in
had the state not acted at all.' 26
In sum, after DeShaney, plaintiffs who hope to succeed in indirect
harm cases must satisfy one of two inquiries.' 2 7 Either they must
convince the court that they were in some meaningful way in cus-
tody, in which case the characterization of the events as action or
inaction is irrelevant, or they must refocus their cases to make the
state's conduct appear as action rather than inaction. Of these two
options, the custody route is more limited. While custody may be a
flexible concept, most individuals are not even arguably in custody.
It is in the transformation of inaction into action that the path for
most plaintiffs lies.' 28
This is incorrect. Not all torts committed by state actors rise to the level of § 1983
claims, because of a variety of doctrinal limitations developed by the courts over many
years. Mere negligence, for example, is not an adequate basis for constitutional liability.
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); see also Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7
F.3d 729, 734 (8th Cir. 1993) ("We cannot agree with those who have suggested that
one comment towards the end of the DeShaney opinion-'nor did [the State] do anything
to render him any more vulnerable to [the risk of private violence]'-signals the
Supreme Court's approval of Section 1983 liability whenever a state actor has increased
the risk of harm from private sources.") (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201) (alterations
in original); infra note 141. Plaintiffs must demonstrate conduct ranging from deliberate
indifference to reckless disregard for their rights. The relevant question in Monahan, for
example, would be was it deliberately indifferent or reckless for the defendants to decide
to use a van to transport the plaintiff. Given all of the circumstances, the answer may
well be that it was not, and hence, no claim for relief was stated.
126. It is true, as Susan Bandes stated in her critique of DeShaney, that the question,
"Was the plaintiff worse off" is incomplete. Bandes, supra note 63, at 2284. It lacks a
baseline. The first response, then, must be, "Worse off than what the plaintiff would
have been under what circumstance?" See id. But this openness and indeterminacy may
(for a litigator) be a virtue as well as a vice. If a plaintiff can identify and present an
alternative version of the events, compared to which she is worse off, she can pose the
question in a way in which it must be answered in the affirmative.
127. In some instances, plaintiffs sue supervisory defendants, asserting that a
subordinate caused harm to the victim. These cases present the potential for two
distinct theories of liability. First, under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436
U.S. 658 (1978), and following cases, supervisory officials and governmental entities
may be held liable where their policies or practices cause the individual violation of
which plaintiffs complain. Proof of policy or practice may, however, be very difficult. As
an alternative basis for liability, plaintiffs may advance an indirect harm theory-that the
defendants are liable because they either failed to protect the victim or took action that
caused her harm. There are several reported opinions arising from cases litigated under
these dual theories of liability. See supra note 120.
128. Cases arising out of indirect harm, which might once have been viewed as
inaction or duty-to-protect cases, can often be recast as cases about state action causing
harm, albeit indirectly. The crucial questions in evaluating a case are: Did the state play
a part in creating the danger, or perhaps in exposing the plaintiff to an already existing
danger? Did it render the plaintiff more vulnerable to harm? As a result of state action,
was the plaintiff placed in a worse position than she would have been had the state not
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Of course, as many-including Justices Brennan and Blackmun-
have noted, there may be no "real" difference between cases about
action and cases about inaction or between duty-to-protect cases
and cases about state action causing indirect harm.' 2 9 The basic
facts may be the same, with the difference only in emphasis and
viewpoint. But whether or not the difference is "real," it can be
substantial enough to lead to different results. 30 For if a case is
viewed as an inaction case, then the plaintiff will probably be
obliged to show custody if she is to prevail, while if a case is per-
ceived to be an action case, she will not be required to do so. 13
This potential is apparent in the post-DeShaney state action-as
opposed to state inaction-cases. 132  These cases focus on the
state's active participation in the circumstances of the case, and from
that perspective, DeShaney is generally distinguishable. 33 While
there is no guarantee that the plaintiff in a case perceived as an ac-
tion case will win, the plaintiff may well surmount the DeShaney hur-
acted at all? These overlapping questions should guide attorneys in developing
narratives of their clients' cases and judges in assessing the application of law to the
facts. As the cases discussed in the following section illustrate, a number of courts have
utilized this analysis in the past five years.
129. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 211-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 212-13
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Bandes, supra note 63, at 2278-85; Kreimer, supra note
63, at 1324-26.
130. For example, in Dwares v. City of New York, the trial court viewed the plaintiff's
claim as one that police officers failed to protect him. 985 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1993). It
found the case controlled by DeShaney and dismissed the complaint. Id. By contrast, the
appellate court viewed the claim as one that the police officers engaged in actions that
made the plaintiff's situation more dangerous. Id. at 99. This distinguished the case
from DeShaney and allowed the appellate court to reinstate the complaint. Id. at 99-100;
see also infra notes 206-20 and accompanying text.
131. It is well beyond the scope of this Article to explore the ways in which each
viewer decides whether a case is about action or inaction. It is clear, however, that
litigation strategy and advocacy plays a role in the process. If the plaintiff and the
defendant agree that a case is about inaction, it is more likely that the judge will also
adopt that view. If they disagree, each will employ techniques to support their view
designed to persuade. See sources cited supra note 13; see also Dorothy J. v. Little Rock
Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993). In DorothyJ, the court initially considered the
plaintiff's claim as one for inaction, evaluating whether the child was in functional
custody. Id. at 732-33. The court then shifted its analysis to consider whether the state
created the danger and could therefore be held liable on an alternative theory. Id. at
733-34.
132. In a number of cases, the differing opinions are divided not only by their legal
analyses, but also by their understanding or rendition of the plaintiff's story. Indeed,
the conflicting opinions embark on separate legal analyses because they adopt different
narrative versions of the case. The judge who accepts or constructs a narrative that
revolves around state inaction will employ a legal analysis that turns on whether the
plaintiff was in custody. See supra note 130.
133. As is discussed elsewhere, these cases present other difficult problems for
plaintiffs, principal among them being proof of causation. See infra notes 194-98 and
accompanying text.
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die. To date, courts and commentators have focused on relatively
narrow problems presented in this area. Hence, the broad outlines
of liability in indirect harm cases remain unexplored and unex-
plained. In the next section of this Article, I consider the cases from
a broader perspective in order to explore and explain the scope of
liability in this area.
IV. SUGGESTED MODELS AND APPROACHES
To begin, let me take a step back to the elemental question any
lawyer or judge must ask when examining a claim: What must a
plaintiff prove to succeed in a section 1983 case focusing on allega-
tions of indirect harm? The Supreme Court has frequently noted
that "the initial inquiry must focus on whether the two essential ele-
ments to a [s]ection 1983 action are present: (1) whether the con-
duct complained of was committed by a person acting under color
of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or the
laws of the United States."' 3 4
This two-element formulation of a section 1983 claim is decep-
tively simple, and further consideration quickly illustrates the actual
complexity of the matter. In a due process case, for example, in
order to establish the second element135 -that the conduct deprived
the plaintiff of a constitutional right-the plaintiff must prove that
the defendant is a "state actor," that the interest at stake is recog-
nized as either "life," "liberty" or "property," and that the conduct
of the defendant "deprived" the plaintiff of the alleged interest.
These requirements encompass terms of great legal complexity.
For example, scholars have long discussed the many conflicting
opinions and doctrines governing whether a defendant may prop-
erly be considered a state actor. 136 Similarly, there are extensive
134. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). This formulation has also been quoted repeatedly by
appellate courts.
135. The first element, color of state law, may create problems of its own. What
constitutes "color of law" has been the focus of extensive scholarship. See, e.g., Steven L.
Winter, The Meaning of "Under Color of Law, " 91 MIcH. L. REV. 323 (1992); Eric H.
Zagrans, "Under Color of" What Law: A Reconstructed Model of Section 1983 Liability, 71 VA.
L. REV. 499 (1985). The Supreme Court has also interpreted the phrase on several
occasions. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil, 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
It is not, however, a requirement that is at issue in most indirect harm cases because the
individuals being sued are state employees acting in the course of employment, which
means that their actions are clearly under color of law.
136. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1688-1720 (2d ed.
1988); Charles L. Black Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Forward: "State Action, "Equal
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bodies of case law and commentary concerning the definition of
constitutionally recognized liberty and property interests. 3 7 The
plaintiff in a section 1983 due process action may be required to
contend with these issues in order to withstand the initial scrutiny of
a court.
Fortunately, in a typical indirect harm case neither of these two
factors presents serious problems.' 3 8 The defendants are, for the
most part, employees of the state-police officers, social workers,
school employees-who are "on-duty" at the time of the relevant
incidents.' 3 9 These defendants are state actors. In addition, the
typical plaintiff complains of physical injury or loss of life. These
injuries implicate the right to bodily integrity, a well-recognized lib-
erty interest, 40 or to life itself.
In indirect harm cases, most of the legal complexity is generated
by the multiple interpretations of the requirement that the plaintiff
show a dprivation of the protected interest. In seeking to give con-
tent to this requirement, courts have imposed a range of obligations
on plaintiffs. Plaintiffs may be required to prove some combination
of the following elements: that the defendant was under a duty to
Protection and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967) (describing the
state action cases as "a conceptual disaster area"). There are numerous Supreme Court
cases discussing the state action requirement. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991
(1982); Edmondson Oil, 457 U.S. at 921; Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982);
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S.
345 (1974).
The relationship between the "color of state law" and state action requirements has
been an additional source of confusion. Though the Court in Lugar stated that if
conduct "constitutes state action as delimited by our prior decisions, then the conduct
[is] also action under color of state law and will support a suit under § 1983," 457 U.S.
at 922, it is not clear that action under color of state law will always constitute state
action.
137. See Siegert v. Gilley, 111 S. Ct. 1789 (1991) (liberty); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976) (liberty); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (liberty and property);
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (liberty); see also Robert J. Glennon,
Constitutional Liberty and Property: Federal Common Law and § 1983, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 355
(1978); Henry P. Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property, "62 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1977).
138. It should be recalled that indirect harm cases are substantive, rather than
procedural, due process cases.
139. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
189 (1989) (social workers); Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707, 708-10 (3d
Cir. 1993) (employee of private school bus company contracted by state); Dwares v. City
of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 1993) (police); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist.,
975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1992) (school employee), cert. denied sub nom. Caplinger v. Doe,
113 S. Ct. 1066 (1993), reh'ggranteden bane, 987 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993); Yvonne L. v.
New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1992) (social workers);
Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) (police), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 938
(1990).
140. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982); Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977).
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the plaintiff; that the defendant acted, rather than failed to act;
and/or that the defendant's action--or possibly inaction-was the
cause of the plaintiff's injury. 14
The remaining elements resemble the familiar requirements of
tort law that a plaintiff prove duty, breach, and causation in order to
make out a negligence claim.' 42 Similarly, as in tort law, there is
confusion about the overlap of the duty and causation require-
ments.' 43 These elements may be used to explain the failure of vari-
ous plaintiffs in various terms. In an indirect harm case, a court may
conclude there is no liability because the police were under no duty
to act, because there can be no liability for inaction, or because the
intervening immediate cause of the harm broke the chain of causa-
tion. 44 The existence of these related but distinct legal rationales,
all of which are widely used and occasionally misused, has deepened
the confusion in this area.
By suggesting a systematic approach to indirect harm cases, I
hope to make possible a more focused analysis of the problems of
141. In some cases, courts require plaintiffs to prove that the defendant acted (or
possibly failed to act) with a particular state of mind. This scienter requirement is
clearly separable from the causation and duty-like requirements discussed above.
Consideration of this topic is beyond the scope of this Article, For the remainder of this
Article, I will simply assume that the requisite state of mind, whatever that may be, is
properly alleged.
There is a substantial body of case law and scholarship on scienter and § 1983. See
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (overruling Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527
(1981), to the extent that Parratt held that negligent deprivation of property was
actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment, but not deciding what scienter is
required); William Burnham, Separating Constitutional and Common Law Torts: A Critique and
a Proposed Theory of Duty, 73 MINN. L. REV. 515 (1989); see also Eaton & Wells, supra note
109, at 159-65 (offering proposal for distinct state-of-mind requirement in indirect harm
cases); Barbara Kritchevsky, Making Sense of State of Mind. Determining Responsibility in
Section 1983 Municipal Liability Litigation, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 417, 470-74 (1992)
(asserting that state of mind of policymaker, not just that of municipal agent, should be
considered in determining § 1983 liability).
142. The increasing use of tort rhetoric in § 1983 litigation has been noted by at least
one scholar. See Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Constitution to
Tort, 77 GEO. L.J. 1719, 1720 (1989) (asserting that Supreme Court, by using tort
rhetoric, is trying to make § 1983 less protective of Fourteenth Amendment rights and is
therefore able to send more proposed § 1983 actions to state courts).
143. See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980); see also Thomas A.
Eaton, Causation in Constitutional Torts, 67 IOWA L. REV. 443, 478-79 (1982) (noting that
courts sometimes phrase issue of defendant's responsibility in terms of causation,
although real issue involves whether and to what extent defendant owed duty to
plaintiff).
144. As it has in torts, questions of duty and causation and the application of these
concepts to particular cases have generated many opinions that are not easily
harmonized. This is not a task I will attempt in this Article. As I discuss more fully
below, in some instances it seems to me more useful to focus on questions of causation
rather than of duty when analyzing cases of indirect harm. See infra text accompanying
notes 194-98.
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the duty/causation dilemma. Thus, it will be clear that in some in-
stances causation is the more useful inquiry, while in others it may
be the existence of a duty. With this additional aspiration in mind, I
proceed with my analysis.
A. Five Models for Indirect Harm Cases
In the remainder of this Article, I develop my contention that in-
direct harm cases can be divided into five separate categories. For
each category, I explore the appropriate legal analysis and identify
the critical questions most likely to arise in cases within that cate-
gory. Categorization is thus crucial, for it brings with it a particular
legal analysis. ' 45
In this section, I present models to illustrate each category. I
have called these the snake pit model, 146 the reliance model, the
unseen state actor model, the absent state actor model, and the ab-
sent institution model. Each is representative of a category that uses
the same name. For each category there is a distinct legal analysis.
Correctly categorizing a case is crucial, because once it is catego-
rized, the legal analysis is determined, and the legal analysis
shapes-and sometimes even dictates-a particular outcome. For
example, if a case is categorized as an unseen actor case, it is in all
likelihood unwinnable, while if it is conceptualized as a snake pit
case, it is very winnable indeed.
145. Categorization and the definition of legal consequences that flow from particular
categorizations is a staple of legal analysis. As Martha Minow has demonstrated in her
recent book, however, it can be a problematic process. Minow is particularly concerned
with the categorization of people and its consequences, principal among them the
creation of what she calls "the dilemma of difference." See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL
THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW (1990) (explaining "the
dilemma of difference" as two-part question-that is, (1) when does treating people
differently emphasize their differences and stigmatize them on that basis, and (2) when
does treating people the same become insensitive to their differences and stigmatize or
hinder them on that basis-then reclassifying question as choice between integration
and separation, similar treatment and special treatment, or neutrality and
accommodation). While I accept Minow's critique of categorization and her
identification of its narrowing potential, I nevertheless believe that the categorization of
indirect harm cases is a valuable enterprise. Further, because I am engaged in the
categorization of fact-patterns rather than of people, I do not believe the dangers she
identifies are presented. On categorization more generally, see GEORGE LAKOFF,
WOMEN, FIRE AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND
(1987).
146. The name is taken from the opinion in Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th
Cir. 1982) ("If the state puts a man in a position of danger.., and then fails to protect
him .... it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit."). It is
a phrase that often has been quoted in indirect harm cases. See, e.g., Walker v. Rowe,
791 F.2d 507, 511 (7th Cir. 1986) (rejecting liability for injuries to prison guards and
noting that "[t]he state must protect those it throws into snake pits, but the state need
not guarantee that volunteer snake charmers will not be bitten").
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At the same time, most cases-at least at the beginning of litiga-
tion-could fit into more than one category. Categorization turns
on which facts are emphasized, which frame of reference and which
viewpoint are chosen, when the story is understood to begin and
end, and a host of other variable factors. For example, a case may
be seen as one where the plaintiff was assaulted by a third party
while the police failed to intervene. Viewed in this light, the case is
one of inaction-an unseen state actor case-and liability is barred
by DeShaney. By considering a broader frame of reference, however,
we may find police action that encouraged the. assault. This con-
verts the case into one of action-a snake pit case-where liability
might be proper. The consequences of categorization are dramatic.
Understanding and manipulating the categories is therefore crucial.
I do not mean to suggest that the process of categorization is itself
a simple one. To the contrary, because most cases may arguably fit
into more than one category and because categorization is a critical
juncture in determining the outcome of a case, the process of cate-
gorization should be a contested topic in litigation, either explicitly
or implicitly. In many cases, the parties disagree about the correct
categorization of the case at hand. Each offers a version of the case
that fits more easily into the category that yields what she views as
the "correct" result. And each employs the lawyer's craft to per-
suade the judge that her categorization is the better one.
Understanding the categories and the analysis I propose should
help to dispel one frequently encountered argument against liability
in particular indirect harm cases: that finding liability would amount
to a first step down a slippery slope, at the bottom of which lies a
constitutional requirement that a state have a police force.' 47 This
is, for every court that has considered the possibility, beyond the
plausible interpretations of the Constitution. 48 The slippery slope
argument is a device for rejecting a claim without regard to its own
merit on the ground that it inevitably leads the court somewhere it
147. See, e.g., Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1984).
148. See Walker, 791 F.2d at 509 ("[Blecause the bill of rights is a charter of negative
liberties, the state need not protect people from danger.") (quoting Bowers, 686 F.2d at
618); Bowers, 686 F.2d at 618 ("The Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it tells
the state to let people alone; it does not require the federal government or the state to
provide services even so elementary a service as maintaining law and order."). But see
Heyman, supra note 109, at 546-54 (arguing that historical analysis demonstrates that
the Fourteenth Amendment was originally understood and intended to incorporate the
right to protection and that it obliged states to protect individuals from private
violence).
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does not wish to go. 149 Reliance on such an argument has been ex-
amined in detail elsewhere. 150 In this setting, however, invocation
of a slippery slope concern is entirely inappropriate. The image of a
slippery slope depends on our appreciation of gravity as an inexora-
ble and ineluctable force. Once you start down a slippery slope,
there is no turning back and-equally important-no stopping
point. If the indirect harm cases fall along a gradient, however,
surely it is one with distinct ledges. There are many points at which
ajurist can say "I go this far and no further." The principle that the
snake pit plaintiff may state a claim does not necessarily mean that
the unseen actor plaintiff can, or even that the reliance plaintiff
can. 15 1
In order to make this discussion more intelligible, I illustrate
these categories with a series of model cases. These are all cases of
indirect harm and they fall along a rough spectrum. My initial pres-
entation of the models is limited. Discussion of the legal analysis
applicable to each category is reserved for the following section.' 52
In each case I have specified circumstances that would support a
conclusion that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to any
risks to the victim.15 3 I have intentionally structured these cases in
this fashion in order to focus on the issues of liability that concern
me in this Article. In particular, I have structured these models in a
way that eliminates or minimizes any questions of intent. It should
also be apparent that each model can be subjected to variation while
maintaining its essential features. I have chosen to present the
models in relatively strong forms so that the theories of liability can
be clearly illustrated, but there are many less obvious cases in which
liability might be premised on the same theories.
I provide two settings for each model case. First, I consider a dis-
crete encounter between a single state actor-in this instance, a po-
lice officer-and an isolated plaintiff. While the actions of plaintiff
and defendant vary with each model, in each the plaintiff is assaulted
by an unknown third party as she walks down a street in a dangerous
neighborhood. I call this the street assault setting. Each case is
then recast in a second setting involving an interaction with an insti-
149. Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REv. 361, 369 (1985). It is not the
instant case that worries the court, but the possibility that allowing the instant case
would lead to a future danger case, which the court seeks to avoid. Id.
150. See id.
151. The reliance case plaintiff may argue that her case is actually a snake pit case.
This argument focuses attention on what the appropriate categorization of a particular
case is and presents no slippery slope problem.
152. See discussion infra part III.B.
153. See supra note 141.
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tutional bureaucracy. For purposes of this exercise, the institution
concerned is a child protective services agency. Again, the actions
of the plaintiff and defendant vary with the particular model, but in
each, the plaintiff child is in a violent home and is injured by a party
independent of the state.' 5 4 I call this the abused child setting.
1. The Snake Pit Model
In the street assault setting of this model, the plaintiff is in the
area where she is attacked because she was abandoned there by the
police department. The police are aware that it is a dangerous area
and are also aware that the victim has to walk some distance in order
to leave the area. After the police depart, she is assaulted and
injured. t55
The model is similar in the abused child setting. A child is re-
moved from her home-which may itself be a dangerous place-and
placed in foster care by the child protective services agency. Unfor-
tunately, the child is placed with a foster parent who is abusive. The
agency is aware of the foster parent's violence. The foster parent
injures the child.
2. The Reliance Model
In the street assault setting, the plaintiff is in the area by her own
choice. She has had no previous contact with the police. As the
plaintiff chooses which route out of the area she will take, she sees a
police officer standing on a street comer. The officer assures the
plaintiff that she (the officer) will offer protection. Plaintiff conse-
quently turns down the street by the officer and, within several
paces, she is attacked. The officer, who can clearly see the attack
154. Cases of indirect harm generally seem to arise in one of two settings-either an
isolated and discrete encounter between a state actor and a victim: e.g., Ross v. United
States, 910 F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1990);Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir.
1983); or an ongoing interaction with a social services agency: e.g., K.H. ex rel Murphy v.
Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social
Servs., 812 F.2d 294, 299-301 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 498 U.S. 189 (1989); Estate of
Bailey v. York, 768 F.2d 503, 505-06 (3d Cir. 1985).
155. There are many possible variations of each hypothetical presented above. For
example, in the snake pit street assault, instead of transporting plaintiff to the area, the
police might impound her car, abandoning her in the area with no transportation, or
they might arrest the driver of a car in which she was traveling, leaving her without
transportation. See, e.g., Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989). These are
minor variations on the same theme. Plaintiffs in either instance may plausibly argue
that the state action caused her to be exposed to the danger.
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and could intervene to protect the plaintiff with complete safety,
does nothing.' 56
In the abused child setting, the protective services agency is aware
of paternal abuse and manifests some intention to deal with it. A
case worker collects reports of the abuse from various neighbors or
relatives, for example, or takes other action and creates the impres-
sion that she will take appropriate action. However, no action is
taken. The reports are simply filed away. The agency does not re-
move the child and the case worker does nothing to prevent further
harm to the child. The parent then seriously injures the child.
3. The Unseen State Actor Model
In the street assault setting, the plaintiff is again in the area by
choice. She elects to walk down a particular street, and she is as-
saulted in the street. There is a police officer conducting surveil-
lance on the street. Plaintiff does not see the officer, but the officer
sees the plaintiff enter the street and observes the assault. Again,
although the police officer could simply and safely intervene, she
does nothing, and the plaintiff is seriously injured.
The abused child setting for this model is similar to the reliance
model. Child protective services is aware of the abuse being in-
flicted by the parent. A case worker is assigned. She opens a file
and maintains records, but does nothing that could be interpreted
as taking any interest in the case. She takes no action to intervene,
and the parent seriously injures the child.
4. The Absent State Actor Model
In the street assault setting, the plaintiff is again in the area by
choice. She chooses her own route through the area. There is no
police officer on the block or in the area. She is attacked and she
calls for help. No police are present and none arrive in time to help
her.157
156. There may be many minor variants of the same theme. The plaintiff in the
reliance street assault may ask the police officer if the particular block is safe or, more
subtly, she may exchange nods with the officer. In each circumstance, plaintiff may
argue that the police officer's action amounted to an assurance, on which she reasonably
relied, that the officer would, within reason, provide the basic protective services
expected of the police. Certainly the case where the officer offers explicit assurance is
stronger than that in which the assurance is tacit, but the cases are similar in structure
and rest on the same theory of liability.
157. It is possible that the absence of police assistance is attributable to chance, to an
individual officer's actions, or to the police department more generally. The officer who
should have been responsible for assisting the plaintiff may have taken an unauthorized
break from patrolling and, hence, could be held responsible for the absence of police
assistance. Or it may be that no officer was within range to assist the victim because of
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In the abused child setting, although the child is abused and there
is an established child protective services agency, the agency does
not take up the case. No action is taken, and the child is severely
injured.
5. The Absent Institution Model
In the street assault setting, there is no police department. Need-
less to say, no police officer intervenes in the assault. In the abused
child setting, there is no child protective services agency.
V. TREATING THE CATEGORIES
All indirect harm cases can be analogized to at least one of these
models.' 58 Understanding the models and the appropriate legal
analysis for each model is a valuable endeavor for two reasons.
First, it enables us to identify and refine predictable and consistent
patterns of liability in indirect harm cases. Plaintiffs whose stories
can be portrayed as snake pit cases or reliance cases may succeed in
a section 1983 action.' 59 Unseen state actor cases probably cannot
be won under section 1983, but may oe litigated under conventional
tort doctrines.' 60 Further, this is an area in which there are very
compelling cases beyond the reach of current constitutional doc-
trine and, hence, it is an area where legislative reform is appropriate
and perhaps plausible as well. Absent state actor and absent institu-
tion cases are extremely rare and present their own specific
problems, quite distinct from those presented by the other indirect
harm cases. Correctly categorizing a case helps identify stronger
and weaker claims. More generally, understanding the categories
assists in devising coherent and constructive approaches, including
legislative approaches, to problems of indirect harm.
poor patrolling patterns or inadequate staffing of particular shifts or areas. These are
institutional failures.
158. I have not included a separate category for cases involving individuals in state
custody. These may be viewed as either snake pit cases or reliance cases, depending on
the particular circumstances. For example, if prison officials know that the prison is
dangerous-that many assaults occur-then in placing a vulnerable individual in prison
they are exposing her to danger. This is the equivalent of throwing someone into a
snake pit. But if instead the victim is ill before imprisonment, perhaps under the care of
a physician, then if she is imprisoned and denied medical care, the resulting case is really
a reliance case. The prison officials neither created the harm, nor exposed her to a new
risk. Rather, they cut her off from another source of aid on which she had relied.
159. Of course, the success of any particular plaintiff depends on many factors,
including the available evidence. In addition to establishing that the state owed a duty
or that it "deprived" plaintiff of a protected interest-the DeShaney question-plaintiffs
must establish that the defendants acted with the requisite degree of culpability and
causation.
160. See infra notes 223-27 and accompanying text.
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Second, many indirect harm cases can be analogized to more than
one model case. As is discussed above, a given client's story may be
transformed into several different cases. The same underlying facts
may form the basis for either a snake pit case or a reliance case. The
decision to relate a case as a snake pit case or an unseen state actor
,case is one of the critical choices that helps to determine whether it
is successful or not. Any lawyer and any judge confronting an indi-
rect harm case should recognize and appreciate the far-reaching
consequences that flow from describing the case as a snake pit case
rather than an unseen actor case, and vice versa.
A. Allocating Liability
I now further consider and explore each category of case. I have
two points to make in doing this. First, I want to illustrate what
happens within each category and how the cases can be and are in
fact dealt with. Second, in discussing real cases decided by real
'courts, I want to highlight the struggle between the parties for con-
trol of the narrative and the results of this struggle. This exempli-
fies my point that most cases could be categorized in several
different ways and that the categorization has a direct impact on the
outcome of the litigation.
1. Liability in a Snake Pit Case
These are the strongest cases for section 1983 liability. In a snake
pit case, the client's story can be most readily shaped into a narra-
tive that focuses on state action rather than inaction, thereby avoid-
ing the pitfalls of DeShaney. Further, the narrative can demonstrate
that the state action created the danger or at least caused plaintiff's
exposure to the dangerous situation, as if the state had hurled the
plaintiff into a snake pit.
The plaintiff in the street assault case, for example, can argue that
the police transported her to the area, that they abandoned her
there without assistance, that the state action exposed her to grave
danger, and that as a result of that exposure, she was injured.' 6'
Her position is unlike that of Joshua DeShaney, where the state
played no part in creating the danger or in rendering him any more
vulnerable to it. Similarly, the state has been held to be liable for a
constitutional violation as a doer of harm where it placed a child
161. The plaintiff would presumably also have to allege some degree of knowledge on
the part of the defendants-that they knew or should have known that they were
exposing her to grave danger, for example. The precise level of culpable conduct
necessary to make out a cause of action is discussed infra note 141.
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with abusive foster parents "just as the Roman state was a doer of
harm when it threw Christians to lions."' 62
The appellate opinions are consistent with this analysis. Several
cases that fit the snake pit model have been litigated, and the appel-
late opinions have favored imposition of liability, both before and
after DeShaney. So, for example, the police may be held liable where
they take a drag-racing driver into custody and then leave the three
children who were with him alone in the abandoned car on a Chi-
cago freeway,' 63 or where they arrest a drunken driver, impound his
car, and leave a passenger stranded in a high crime area at 2:30
A.M.t64 In each of these circumstances, the police have exposed the
plaintiff to danger. Similarly, state defendants have been held liable
where they permitted an unsupervised prisoner to have use of a pa-
trol car, and the prisoner used the car-complete with flashing
lights-to stop a civilian whom he assaulted and killed.165 In this
instance, the police actually participated in creating the danger. Lia-
bility has also been imposed in other snake-pit like circumstances. 166
'162. K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 1990).
163. White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
164. Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 938
(1990). While the discussion of DeShaney is quite brief, the court dismisses its
applicability to Wood by noting that the state played an active part in creating the danger
here. Id. at 590. In its subsequent discussion rejecting the defendant's claim to
qualified immunity, the court explicitly discussed the Seventh Circuit's snake pit
reasoning with apparent approval. See id. at 592-94. But see Hilliard v. City & County of
Denver, 930 F.2d 1516, 1520-21 (10th Cir.) (rejecting claim on facts similar to Wood on
grounds that constitutional right to due process was not clearly established, and hence,
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 656 (1991). In
Hilliard, the court based its decision on fact that state tort remedies may have existed
and did not conclusively state whether the facts established a violation of constitutional
rights. Id.
165. Nishiyama v. Dickson County, 814 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1987) (en banc); see also
supra note 60.
166. In addition to those discussed above, there are a number of other cases that I
would categorize as snake pit cases. See Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1993)
(police arrested original driver, leaving drunk driver with car and keys, thereby creating
danger; drunk driver eventually caused accident with plaintiff); Dwares v. City of New
York, 985 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1993) (police conspired with assailants and therefore
enhanced danger; they did not simply fail to intervene); L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119,
121-22 (9th Cir. 1992) (prison knowingly employed violent male sex offender to assist
female nurse in solitary setting and offender attacked nurse), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2442
(1993); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1519-24 (7th Cir. 1990) (reversing
grants of summary judgment in favor of city and police lieutenant on § 1983 claims,
where police had trained and armed officer and then had allowed him to retain his gun
when he was relieved of duty due to mental illness); Cornelius v. Town of Highland
Lake, 880 F.2d 348, 357-59 (11th Cir. 1989) (reversing summary judgment for
defendants where town employed prison inmates to work in town hall and inmates then
abducted town clerk), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990); C.M. v. Southeast Delco Sch.
Dist., 828 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (student injured by abusive individual
employed by school district as teacher); G-69 v. Degnan, 745 F. Supp. 254 (D.NJ. 1990)
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While an assertion that the plaintiff is worse off may provide a
basis for liability, the contrary assertion-that the plaintiff is no
worse off-does not defeat liability. The defendant in a snake pit
case cannot successfully resist liability on the ground that the victim
faced danger even before the state acted and hence, is no worse off
than she would have been absent the state action. It cannot claim,
for example, in the abused child case, that the child was subject to
physical abuse before any state action occurred and might well have
suffered the same fate absent any state action. "The state, having
saved a man from a lynch mob, cannot then lynch him on the
grounds that he will be no worse off than if he had not been
saved." 16 7 It is enough that state action caused the harm that in-
jured the child. This satisfies the requirements of the Due Process
Clause. 168
Because a snake pit case is a strong one from the plaintiff's per-
spective, defendants may seek to retell a different story that resem-
bles a different model-to dispute the characterization of the case as
a snake pit case.' 69 One way to do this is to begin the story at a later
point, after the plaintiff in the street assault model has arrived at the
location in question. In that time frame, there is no readily per-
(finding that where police had induced individual to become informant with promises of
personal protection, and state had benefitted from dangerous position of plaintiff, state
had affirmatively assumed duty to plaintiff that it could not discard consistent with due
process); see also Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331 (6th Cir. 1993) (although
properly categorized as snake pit case, court mistakenly upheld summary judgment for
defendants on basis of qualified immunity); Medina v. City & County of Denver, 960
F.2d 1493, 1497 n.5, 1501 (10th Cir. 1992) (same); Hilliard, 930 F.2d at 1519; Swader v.
Commonwealth, 743 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Va. 1990) (where mother was employed as a
nurse on state prison grounds, and lived outside fenced-in portion of prison, and state
improperly allowed unaccompanied inmate outside fenced-in portion, who subsequently
raped and murdered mother's child, mother stated a claim for relief based on duty of
state to provide protection). For further discussion of cases erroneously deciding snake
pit cases on qualified immunity grounds, see supra note 55.
167. K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 1990). It is difficult to
harmonize this decision with the suggestion in the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Reed v.
Gardner that if the first driver (the one arrested by the police) was also drunk, then there
is no cause of action because the car would have been driven by a drunk driver in either
event. Reed, 986 F.2d at 1125-26.
168. This can be understood as a struggle over when the relevant narrative begins.
Plaintiff would begin with the state action that created or exposed the victim to danger-
the placement of the child with the abusive foster home. The defendant would start at
an earlier point that reveals the child's initial abuse by its biological parents. As the
discussion above demonstrates, the condition of the child before the state action is not
legally relevant.
169. In virtually all cases, the defendants will also dispute the plaintiff's factual claims.
They will deny that they abandoned passengers or children in dangerous areas. These
defenses raise factual questions that must be resolved by the jury. In addition,
defendants may raise a defense of failure of causation. See infra text accompanying notes
170-72.
ceived state action, only inaction. The defendant's version of Wood
v. Ostrander might be simply that plaintiff was assaulted by an un-
known assailant while she was walking down the street at night, but
she wishes to sue the police, alleging that they failed to protect her
from the assault. 170 The defendants can then argue that because
she was not in custody, there was no duty to protect her. If this
construction of events is accepted, the claim parallels the unseen
actor model. Such a claim fails under DeShaney.171
This is not to suggest that once a case is identified as a snake pit
case the defendant is without defense. In virtually all cases, the de-
fendants dispute the plaintiff's factual claims. They deny that they
abandoned the passenger in dangerous areas, raising factual ques-
tions that must be resolved by the jury.1 72 In addition, defendants
may assert that an intervening cause has broken the legal chain of
causation and absolves them of liability. This is a potential defense
to an indirect harm case. However, the mere fact that the direct
cause of harm is an actor independent of the defendant does not
ensure the success of this defense. It is, for example, precisely the
foreseeability of the independent act-the street assault-that made
the defendant's conduct in abandoning the plaintiff problematic in
the first place. That the foreseen act occurred does not defeat liabil-
ity. In some cases, however, there may be additional intervening
acts that do allow for a defense of lack of causation. 73
2. Liability in a Reliance Case
Liability in a reliance case is consistent with DeShaney. Joshua
DeShaney's claim failed in part because the state did not "do any-
thing to render him more vulnerable" to harm. 174 To establish 1ia-
170. 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 938 (1990); see discussion infra
notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
171. If the defendants' version of the narrative is accepted, the fact that the plaintiff
may have been briefly in police custody while she was transported to the area will not
save her. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-
201 (1989).
A second defense available in a snake pit case might be that the intervening and
independent actor who is the immediate cause of the harm severs the chain of legal
causation. As a general matter, this is a weak defense in a snake pit case. It is the
foreseeability of the intervening action that makes the state actor's original conduct
problematic, and thus, the defense of intervening conduct is probably not available.
Further, in § 1983 litigation, causation in generally viewed as a question for the fact-
finder.
172. See, e.g., Wood, 879 F.2d at 583. On remand, Wood was tried before a jury, and a
verdict for defendants was returned, presumably because the jury did not consider that
the plaintiff had proved the facts that formed the basis for the complaint.
173. See, e.g., infra notes 206-20 and accompanying text.
174. DeShaney, 489 US. at 201.
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bility, then, the plaintiff must distinguish herself from DeShaney by
alleging and proving some action on the part of the state-that is,
that the state "did" something.' 75 Further, the state action must
have made the victim more vulnerable to harm.
In a reliance case, these requirements may be met. First, some
activity of a state actor leads a critical actor-either the plaintiff or a
potential rescuer-to refrain from action of their own and instead
rely on the state. It might be the assurances of the police officer, the
case worker, or even the command of an officer at an accident scene.
From the perspective of the critical actor, there is state action,
rather than simple inaction. Second, because the action induces the
critical actor to refrain from action of her own, it deprives the plain-
tiff of one potential avenue of rescue or protection, which may
render the plaintiff more vulnerable to danger.' 76 Liability in these
instances is consistent with the duty to rescue imposed in torts.' 77
For example, in the street assault case, the best point of view for
the plaintiff to use is that of the victim. From the police officer's
perspective, this may not appear to be a case of action causing harm.
An outside observer might reach the same conclusion. The victim
can testify, however, that the police officer's assurance was action.
She must also establish that the action rendered her more vulnera-
ble to harm. To do this, she must establish that as a consequence of
the state action, in reliance on it, she altered her behavior in a way
that exposed her to greater danger or increased her exposure to
existing danger. Perhaps she chose a particular street or was less
alert to the activities on the street around her. Thus, the officer's
action rendered her more vulnerable than she would otherwise have
been. Where it is reasonable for the plaintiff to have relied upon the
state actor and, as a result of that reliance, the plaintiff is rendered
more vulnerable, and where this is predictable and foreseeable,
there is a sound basis for liability. 178
175. This may mean that the story needs to be told from a perspective that reveals the
state action. What we recognize as action depends on our point of view. From the point
of view of one observer, a particular object may appear to be moving. But from the
point of view of a second observer, the same object could appear stationary. Thus, one
would report action, while the other would report no action.
176. This approach is similar in some regards to that pursued by Justice Brennan in
his dissent in DeShaney. 489 U.S. at 207-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Yet it is not an
approach rejected by the majority. Rather, the majority concludes there is no evidence
to support the conclusion that state action made Joshua more vulnerable. See id. at 203.
177. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) § 324 (1965) (imposing liability on one
who comes to aid of person and then leaves that person in worse position).
178. It should be clear that the street assault model is one of many possible variations
on the same theme. The case could be made much more difficult by envisioning police
actions that are not such explicit assurances of protection. As long as the action of the
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In the abused child reliance case, a different focus must be
adopted. A child essentially is unable to protect herself, with or
without action by the state. Therefore, a child--or other helpless
person-cannot show that she altered her behavior in reliance on
the state in a manner that made her more vulnerable than she would
have been otherwise. Instead, she must incorporate the viewpoint
of some other potential rescuer-a concerned relative or health pro-
fessional, for example. The plaintiff initially must demonstrate
some state action, which might be taking reports of abuse or other-
wise demonstrating an interest in the case. From the would-be res-
cuers' point of view, the state action in manifesting its concern
encourages-or, in some cases, may even compel-the potential res-
cuer to rely on the state instead, and hence prevents the rescuer
from taking any action of her own. Again, plaintiff would do best to
establish that because of the action of the state, a person who would
have taken action to assist the plaintiff did not do so. The state's
action thus renders the victim more vulnerable because it cuts her
off from an alternative source of protection, and it may be a basis for
liability under current Supreme Court case law.1 79
One extreme example of a reliance case is Ross v. United States.' 80
Gordon Johnson, a Lake County, Illinois, police officer, intervened
to prevent willing and apparently able rescuers-including members
of the Waukegan police and fire departments-from going to the aid
of a drowning boy. 18 The officer acted pursuant to a county policy
that only county personnel would conduct rescues. When the
county police failed to implement their own rescue in a timely fash-
police officer is such that a reasonable person would understand it as an assurance, the
fundamental element of a reliance case could be shown.
179. Imposition of liability in reliance cases is sound from a policy perspective, as
well. Citizens are frequently encouraged to rely on state professionals rather than on
self-help. We are, at least in the view of many professionals, better off if we rely on
trained firefighters and police officers than if we attempt to extinguish fires or
apprehend criminals ourselves. Drivers approaching an accident are routinely waved
on. It may well be desirable to keep traffic moving and allow those with special training
to control the accident scene. Thus, it is better that other drivers obey the directives
rather than stop and engage in their own ad hoc rescue efforts. Yet, if the officers on the
scene have no obligation to do anything and can stand idly by while the victims perish,
perhaps the concerned citizen should ignore the officer's directives and intervene at any
cost. Recognition of the obligation to take action, in part achieved through imposition
of liability where the officer has manifested assumption of responsibility for a situation,
would-encourage the desired reactions on the part of all concerned.
180. 910 F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1990).
181. Id. at 1424-25.
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ion, the boy drowned. The boy would have been rescued and would
have survived had Johnson not intervened. 82
The plaintiff sued a number of defendants, including the City of
Waukegan, Lake County, and Officer Johnson. The district court
entered judgment against the plaintiff as to all defendants. 8 3 Plain-
tiff appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit reinstated the complaint as to Lake County and
Johnson. The court readily distinguished DeShaney and Seventh Cir-
cuit precedent by noting that this was not a case of governmental
failure to aid, which would be inaction and hence would not be ac-
tionable under DeShaney. Rather, this was an instance of the govern-
ment affirmatively acting to cut off other sources of assistance:
" 'When a state cuts off sources of private aid, it must provide re-
placement protection.' -184 Indeed, the court went so far as to con-
clude that "a constitutional right that prevented a police officer
from cutting off private avenues of lifesaving rescue without provid-
ing an alternative" was clearly established in 1985.185 At the same
time, the court upheld the dismissal of the claim against Waukegan,
which was grounded in the failure of its officers to act, finding that
its liability was foreclosed by DeShaney. 186
As Ross is described by the Seventh Circuit, it is a reliance case. 187
The basis for liability is that the state took action and that others
182. Id. at 1425. For purposes of its decision, the court assumed that William would
have survived had Johnson not stopped the rescuers. Id. The statement of the facts was
taken from the complaint and included all favorable inferences. Id. at 1424. As the
court made clear, whether the plaintiff could prove these facts was a question for a later
stage in the litigation. Id. The police were allegedly acting pursuant to a policy that only
official personnel could attempt rescues. Id. at 1425.
183. Id. at 1425-26.
184. Id. at 1431 (quoting Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1223 (7th Cir.
1988) (en banc)).
185. Id. at 1432. This holding was necessary to support the court's denial of qualified
immunity to Johnson. See id. at 1432-33. But see Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443 (7th
Cir. 1984) (finding no liability where police blocked striking firefighters access to fire-
fighting equipment, thereby preventing them from rescuing victims in burning
building).
186. See Ross, 910 F.2d at 1428-29.
187. Recent reliance cases include Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 147
(5th Cir. 1992) (parents, guardians, and children have little choice but to rely on school
officials for protection and security), cert. denied sub nom. Caplinger v. Doe, 113 S. Ct.
1066 (1993), reh'g granted en banc, 987 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993); Freeman v. Ferguson,
911 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1990) (defendant police chief directed police officers to cease
efforts to protect plaintiff); Pinder v. Commissioners of Cambridge, 821 F. Supp. 376 (D.
Md. 1993) (mother relied on assurances of police that former boyfriend, who had
threatened violence and had previous convictions for arson against plaintiff, would be
held in custody); see also Estate of Sinthasomphone v. City of Milwaukee, 785 F. Supp.
1343 (E.D. Wis. 1992) (police responded to call for help from two women who had
discovered drugged and beaten victim in street and then, despite women's protestations,
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relied on that action, thereby rendering the victim more vulnerable
to harm. Ross resembles the abused child model more closely than
the street assault model, in that the state did not interfere with the
victim's efforts to protect himself, but rather with the efforts of
others to protect him. Further, Ross is an extreme case in that the
reliance of the original rescuers was forced upon them when they
were threatened with arrest if they attempted rescue. But Ross ex-
emplifies the general principle of a reliance case-that the state took
action on which the victim or others relied and thus increased the
vulnerability of the plaintiff.
Ross might have been presented and understood as an unseen
state actor case-a case of state inaction. The plaintiff might have
claimed that Officer Johnson and Lake County were obliged to res-
cue the drowning boy and failed to do so. Had plaintiff relied on
this theory, the dismissal of the case would have been upheld. 8 It
was critical to the plaintiff's success in Ross that the story be per-
ceived as one about state action rather than inaction. This percep-
tion was enhanced by the court's adoption of a broader view of the
incident, which included the initial state action of preventing the
earlier rescue as part of the incident. Had the court chosen to begin
its version of the story with the county's failure to provide substitute
rescue services, only state inaction would have been apparent. The
active version of events is also strengthened by the inclusion of the
perspective of the would-be rescuers. It is from their point of view
that the state action is most clearly visible.
It is useful to contrast Ross with Jackson v. City ofJoliet,' 89 an earlier
Seventh Circuit decision. In Jackson, a police officer came to the
scene of a one-car accident within two minutes of the time when the
accident occurred. The car was beginning to burn and its wheels
were still spinning. The officer called for the fire department, but
made no effort to see if the individuals in the car needed assistance
or, indeed, were still alive. While waiting for additional rescue serv-
ices to arrive, the officer directed traffic around the accident scene.
After the fire department arrived and put out the fire, an ambulance
was called. The people in the car died of their injuries. They would
have survived had the officer aided them when he arrived at the
returned victim to custody of his assailant, Jeffrey Dahmer). Sinthasomphone could also be
conceptualized as a snake pit case, but the opinion of the court clearly employs the
reasoning of a reliance case.
188. This is clear from the court's affirmance of the dismissal of Waukegan. The court
refused to permit the plaintiff to pursue a claim based on Waukegan's failure to rescue.
See supra text accompanying note 185.
189. 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1045 (1984).
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scene, called for an ambulance immediately, or not directed traffic
in a way that prevented potential rescuers from saving them. 90
The Seventh Circuit focused principally on the claims that the of-
ficer had failed to rescue the accident victims or to call for an ambu-
lance. Viewed in this fashion, Jackson is an inaction case. 19 1
Anticipating DeShaney, the court rejected the notion that there is an
affirmative constitutional right to receive elementary protective
services. '9 2 The court's consideration of the plaintiffs' final basis for
liability was cursory. It simply noted that it was "extremely unlikely
that a passing motorist would enter a burning car on the off chance
that the occupants were still in it and if so were still alive, and it is
even less likely that a passing motorist would have extinguished the
fire."193
Comparing Ross and Jackson underscores two points. First, these
are similar cases decided by the same circuit, yet reaching opposite
results. The crucial difference between the cases is that Ross is
deemed to be about state action-a reliance case-andJackson about
state inaction-an unseen state actor case. Yet Ross might have been
seen as an inaction case and Jackson could have been seen as an ac-
tion case. Thus, considering Ross and Jackson together demonstrates
that the categorization of a particular case is critical and that it is
also contestable in many instances. Second, if Ross and Jackson both
are analyzed as reliance cases, they can be contrasted to illuminate
the contours of liability within this category of cases.
It is important to understand the similarities and differences that
the two cases present. There were neither allegations nor evidence
of other potential rescuers in Jackson. Had other rescuers existed,
from their point of view as well as the point of view of the victims,
the state actor played a very similar role to that played by Officer
Johnson in Ross. The difference between the state action in Ross and
that in Jackson is one of degree. In Ross, the police threatened arrest
if the rescue was attempted. In Jackson, they waved off potential res-
cuers. Jackson and Ross are two points on a continuum that runs
from cases where the police physically bar others from assisting-as
may be true in the case of a person held in prison-to cases where a
police officer is simply present. Even the mere presence of a police
officer may convey a message to many well-meaning citizens that the
situation is under control and no action on their part is needed.
Even that which, from the police officer's viewpoint, may seem like
190. Id. at 1201-02.
191. Id. at 1202-03.
192. Id. at 1202-05.
193. Id. at 1205.
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pure inaction may convey an important message to a passerby and
therefore be seen as action.
Jackson could have been seen as a reliance case. It was not seen
this way because the court there adopted a narrow view of the scope
of the relevant facts and did not consider the viewpoint of potential
rescuers. In doing so, it categorizedJackson as an unseen state actor
case. Ross could also have been seen as an unseen state actor case.
It was not seen this way because, in that case, the court adopted a
broad view of the scope of the relevant facts; one that included the
viewpoint of the potential rescuers. The factor that distinguishes
these two cases and determines their outcomes is the categorization
of the case-whether the court saw action or inaction. This was one
of the issues-and, as it turns out, a critical issue-that was deter-
mined during the course of the litigation. Judges and lawyers need
to appreciate the importance of this issue and explicitly focus onit. 194
This is not to say that there should be liability in all cases that can
be categorized as reliance cases. Courts must draw a line some-
where on the spectrum of state involvement and decide that in some
instances the state's conduct is not such as to warrant imposition of
liability based on the Constitution. Liability cannot be limitless.
Sometimes the state action is too tangential or too insignificant.
Development of a meaningful doctrine of causation would be the
most desirable way of restricting liability in reliance cases. That the
plaintiff has showed state action that rendered her at least theoreti-
cally more vulnerable does not complete the analysis of liability.
The plaintiff must also establish that the state action caused the
harm to the plaintiff.
This may well be a difficult problem in some reliance cases, as can
be appreciated if Jackson is analyzed as a reliance case. Did the of-
ficer's action in waving away potential rescuers, the action for which
he might be held liable, cause harm to the accident victims? Would
someone have stopped? If so, would they have attempted rescue?
194. DeShaney itself could be reconceptualized as a reliance case; that is, a story told
not from the point of view of the child (who was helpless to protect himself), but from
the point of view of a concerned adult who might have intervened but for the actions of
the state, which either deterred her or otherwise prevented her from intervening.
Obviously, part of the plaintiff's difficulty might be in identifying and locating such a
person. And it is impossible to say whether there was such an adult in DeShaney's case.
But surely not all DeShaney-type cases are lost. If Joshua DeShaney's mother had
returned to the scene and had attempted to remove Joshua from his father's custody to
protect him from the violence that prevailed in that household, and if the state had
instructed her to rely on DSS, the outcome might have been different.
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If so, would it have been successful?' 95 Each of these questions
must be answered in the affirmative in order to establish liability.' 96
If any one is not, then the plaintiff's case fails. If Ross and Jackson are
both correctly decided, it is not because one is a reliance case and
the other an unseen actor case, but rather because the evidence of
causation was weaker in Jackson than in Ross. 197
While careful scrutiny of causation is the appropriate means for
limiting liability in reliance cases, in some instances the traditional
doctrine must be modified, given the particular features of a reliance
case. Where the scenario is similar to the street assault case and
where the victim survives, the victim herself may be able to provide
the necessary evidence that there was action on which she relied that
can be shown to have caused her harm. Proof of causation-that the
state action actually caused the victim to be more vulnerable-is
possible through the victim's own testimony. Similarly, in some un-
usual cases-like Ross-it may be possible to identify the would-be
rescuers and provide evidence that they would have acted. But fre-
quently, it is impossible for the plaintiff to specifically identify peo-
ple who might have helped but were prevented or deterred.
Given the peculiar circumstances of reliance cases, it may be ap-
propriate, at least in some instances, to shift the burden of proof of
noncausation to the defendant, because it is the defendant's con-
duct that made proof impossible for the plaintiff.198 For example,
the plaintiff in Jackson could not show that someone else would have
stopped or how that person would have behaved had they stopped,
because the action of the police scattered all possible witnesses.
Under these circumstances, where the state exercise of power has
denied the plaintiff the ability to produce the required proof, shift-
ing the burden is the appropriate response. 199
195. These questions are briefly raised by the court inJackson. Id. The court did not,
however, ground its decision on the failure of causation. Instead, it declined to resolve
these factual questions and based its holding on the absence of any duty to provide
rescue services. Jackson, however, has subsequently been reinterpreted by its own
author, Judge Posner, to rest on the failure of causation grounds. See DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 302 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 498
U.S. 189 (1989). This approach is more consistent with a reliance analysis.
196. It should be noted that causation is generally considered to be ajury question in
§ 1983 cases. Thus, it is the jury that will most often have to answer these questions.
This is difficult to do without indulging in speculation.
197. Given the analysis of the court in Jackson, it is not possible to assess the evidence
of causation that was presented or available.
198. At a minimum, this would mean shifting the burden of production to the
defendant.
199. An alternative approach that simplifies the causation problem would be to
conclude that once the state acts to increase the danger to a person in some manner, it
has a corresponding obligation to take action to mitigate against the increased risk of
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Finally, it is important to recognize that the obligation imposed
upon the state in a reliance case is limited. If the state increases the
vulnerability of an individual through reliance, it need not under-
take to protect the individual from the harm absolutely. It would be
adequate to take action to negate the increased risk. Thus, it might
be enough if the child protective services agency told all concerned
that it would do nothing,200 or if the police officer clearly informed
the victim that she would receive no protection from the officer.
This negates any possible reliance.
For the person in prison, this may lead to an anomalous result. If
the basis for an obligation to provide medical care is that the person
has been cut off from her own sources of care, then the jailer would
only need to allow a prisoner to do what she would be able to do for
herself on the outside. For many indigent prisoners, this would
mean that they would receive no medical care, as might well be the
case were they not in prison. For a convicted prisoner, that result
would be inconsistent with Estelle. Standing idly by while a person
unnecessarily suffers from an untreated injury or illness violates the
Eighth Amendment. But for a pretrial detainee, the Fourteenth
Amendment would demand nothing more. Thus, depending on the
resources of the prisoner, we could find ourselves back in the posi-
tion that was deemed unacceptable in City of Revere and Romeo-a
situation where the convicted prisoner gets better treatment than
the innocent.20 1
The resolution to this dilemma must be to recognize that there
are two independent components to Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tections that can be invoked. First, for those in a traditional custody
setting where the Eighth Amendment would apply, except for its
limitation to cases of convicted criminals, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment must give what the Eighth Amendment would give. It func-
tions as an equalizer. In addition, the Due Process Clause ensures
that the state may not 'make an individual more vulnerable to
harm. Thus, if it prevents others from rescuing, it has an obligation to provide
substitute rescue services. This appears to be the approach adopted in Ross v. United
States, 910 F.2d 1422, 1432-33 (7th Cir. 1990). If the problem is conceptualized as a
failure to rescue, it is a much simpler matter for the plaintiff to show that the failure to
rescue caused the harm-that is, that the rescue could have been conducted. Plaintiffs
could then assert that the initial state action gave rise to a duty to act and the failure to
fulfill that duty to act caused the harm. Whatever its merits, this approach is less likely
to meet with success, as it again frames the issue in terms of state inaction.
200. See, e.g., Doe v. Milwaukee County, 903 F.2d 499, 501 (7th Cir. 1990). The court
did not rely on this fact, but rather found that DeShaney barred liability. Id. at 502.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 27-34.
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harm.20 2 This second aspect of due process protection is applicable
to all individuals, whether or not they are in custody. For those who
are not in traditional custody, it is the only right to protection from
indirect harm that may be claimed.
Liability in reliance cases is firmly grounded in the Fourteenth
Amendment as it has been interpreted in DeShaney. Where a plain-
tiff can construct a narrative in which she or others relied on state
action, and thus her peril was increased, she may state a viable claim
for relief. Yet state liability in reliance cases is not limitless. Rather,
it can be constrained through careful application of causation
requirements.
3. Liability in an Unseen State Actor Case
DeShaney most directly controls liability in an unseen actor case.
In such a case, a state actor may be present at an incident and may
even engage in affirmative conduct, but the actor's presence and
conduct has no discernible effect on the behavior of the other indi-
viduals involved in the incident because the actor is unseen. Under
these circumstances, from any nonstate actor perspective, the inci-
dent would have unfolded in the same manner had the state actor
been absent or nonexistent. In the view of the DeShaney Court, there
is no "action" under these circumstances. The Court only recog-
nizes action where conduct has some specific and visible effect on
other individuals. If the state actor's presence and conduct does not
change the behavior of other individuals, then no matter what the
state actor does, the case will be treated as an inaction case. This
leaves the plaintiff without recourse, unless it can be demonstrated
that the victim was in custody.203
For example, in the street assault setting, although the police of-
ficer was aware of the peril to the victim, the victim was not aware of
the police officer and therefore cannot demonstrate reliance. Noth-
ing the police officer did increased the vulnerability of the plaintiff.
The officer neither created the danger nor exposed the victim to a
pre-existing danger. The story would have unfolded in the same
manner had the officer not been present at all. The only complaint
the victim can raise is that the officer failed to rescue her-the pre-
cise complaint foreclosed by DeShaney.
Similarly, because the child protective services agency manifested
no interest in the case, there is no conduct that prevented or de-
202. For an opinion written by Judge Posner reaching the same conclusion, but
reasoning by analogy to tort law, see K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (7th
Cir. 1990).
203. See supra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
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terred another potential rescuer. Child protective services did not
do anything to affect the conduct of the other participants in the
story, and hence, no agency action is perceived.
DeShaney is a more concrete instance of this model. The various
actions taken by the defendants-receiving and recording informa-
tion and communicating with various concerned parties-were
judged by the majority to have had no effect on the actions of the
other participants in the narrative.20 4 Because these actions had no
apparent effect on anyone else, it was, for the majority, the same as
if they had never been taken at all-as if the actors were invisible or
nonexistent. They were of no consequence. Hence the case is seen
as one of inaction, for which the Court determined there can be no
liability. This reasoning-that conduct is defined as action only
where it has impact on others, and that there can be no constitu-
tional liability without action 205-- dictates the result in unseen actor
cases. Under DeShaney, there is no liability in a case viewed as an
unseen actor case. 20
6
An example of a recent case that was ultimately analyzed as an
unseen actor case, and hence an instance where the plaintiffs' claim
was dismissed, is Gregory v. City of Rogers.207 Gregory is also a case
where the parties contested the appropriate categorization of the
case. Counsel for the plaintiffs offered a snake pit narrative, while
204. This is a reasonable conclusion to reach, given the record in the case.
205. There are circumstances where an institutional-as opposed to an individual-
failure to act can give rise to constitutional liability. Liability will be imposed on a
municipality for failing to train and/or supervise officers, where the failure amounts to
deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of citizens, and where the failure to
train or supervise causes the underlying violation of constitutional rights. City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). Apparently, the state action of establishing a
police force gives rise to obligations to train and to supervise.
This does not extend liability to new situations in cases of indirect harm, although it
does broaden the range of potential defendants. In an unseen state actor case, there is
no underlying violation of a constitutional right because there is no constitutional
obligation to protect the plaintiff. As a result, failure to train to protect does not
demonstrate deliberate indifference to constitutional rights of citizens. See City of Los
Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 797-99 (1986) (per curiam) (holding that where jury
had exonerated defendant police officer of violating plaintiff's constitutional rights,
municipality could not be held liable). On the other hand, there is an underlying
constitutional violation in a snake pit case. Failure to train or supervise would be an
appropriate basis for municipal liability in a snake pit case.
206. See, e.g., McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1991); Doe v. Milwaukee
County, 903 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1990).
207. 974 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1265 (1993). The
proliferation of en banc opinions in indirect harm cases is a measure of how difficult
these cases are.
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the defendants' attorney formulated a case based on the unseen ac-
tor model. 20 8
According to the undisputed facts that formed the basis for the
defendants' motion for summary judgment, the police in Rogers,
Arkansas, stopped a car driven by Stanley Turner at 2:30 A.M. after it
ran a red light. 20 9 The passengers, Joe Edwin Gregory-who owned
the car-and Donna Mae Fields, were drunk. Turner, who was the
"designated driver," was not. Turner told the police that he was
driving Fields and Gregory home. In checking Turner's license, the
police discovered that he was wanted on a warrant for failure to ap-
pear in an unrelated matter. The police directed Turner to drive to
the police station and there, at approximately 3:00 A.M., they took
him into custody. Gregory and Fields remained in the car, in the
parking lot of the police station. Soon after that, Gregory drove off
and, within minutes, was in a very serious accident. Gregory was
killed and Fields was injured.210
In the ensuing litigation, the district court granted the defend-
ants' motion for summary judgment.2 1I A panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district
court.21 2 This opinion was subsequently withdrawn21 3 and the en
banc court affirmed the district court's dismissal.2 14 The en banc
court concluded that "a reasonable trier of fact could not find that
Officer Howell affirmatively placed Gregory and Fields in danger
208. See id. at 1010. The defense attorney offered an alternative argument that was at
least partially accepted by the court-that even if the case were a snake pit case, the
intervening actions of an independent actor severed the chain of causation. See id. at
1011-12. The defendant "could not foresee Turner abdicating his responsibility as their
designated driver, and it was his abdication that placed Gregory and Fields in danger,
not officer Howell's performance of his official duty." Id.; see also supra text
accompanying notes 170-72.
209. Gregory, 974 F.2d at 1007-08.
210. Id. at 1008. The majority concluded that there was not enough evidence to infer
that the defendant police officers were aware that Gregory and Fields were drunk. Id. at
1010-11. But see id. at 1013-14 (Heaney, J., dissenting). If the officers did not know that
Gregory and Fields were drunk, they would have had no reason to know that leaving
them in the car might be analogous to hurling them into a snake pit, and without some
knowledge (actual or presumed), there would be no liability. The majority, however, did
not rest its opinion solely on the defendants' knowledge of the victims' condition. It
rejected liability even if the defendant knew the victims were intoxicated, because the
defendant police officer had not affirmatively placed Gregory and Fields in danger when
they were left in the car by Turner at the police station. Id, at 1011.
211. Id. at 1009.
212. Gregory v. City of Rogers, 921 F.2d 750 (8th Cir. 1990), vacated and withdrawn for
reh'gen banc, 939 F.2d 524 (8th Cir. 1991), and opinion on reh'gen banc, 974 F.2d 1006 (8th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1265 (1993).
213. 939 F.2d 524 (8th Cir. 1991).
214. Gregory, 974 F.2d at 1012.
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.... "215 It rejected the plaintiffs' claims, essentially concluding that
Gregory was not a snake pit case, but was instead an unseen actor
case and that DeShaney controlled the result.
A review of the parties' briefs highlights the different narratives
constructed from the same facts. In presenting their case to the
Eighth Circuit, the plaintiffs framed their story as one where state
action-the detention of Turner-jeopardized the lives of Gregory
and Fields.2 16 The action of the police interfered with the arrange-
ment that Gregory and Fields had made to ensure their safety. The
active intervention of the police distinguished this case from
DeShaney. Under the circumstances, liability could be imposed.2 1 7
By contrast, the defendants framed the facts in a very different
way. The defendants focused on the interactions between Turner
and the police and on the absence of interactions between the pas-
sengers and the police. 21 8 The principal culprits were Turner and
the passengers themselves, whose actions were seen as entirely un-
expected. 21 9 The defendants' central point was that no action taken
by the police endangered Gregory and Fields.220 The defendants
asserted that the plaintiffs' claims rested on the failure of the police
to protect them and that therefore DeShaney would allow liability for
failure to act only if the passengers were in custody. Because they
were not, there was no liability.
The outcome in Gregory turned on which narrative the court
adopted. Had the police acted to endanger Gregory and Fields, or
had they simply failed to protect them from themselves? The dis-
trict court viewed the case as a case of inaction governed by
DeShaney. Because the passengers of the car were not in the custody
of the defendants, DeShaney demanded dismissal. The original ap-
pellate panel accepted the plaintiffs' version, describing this as a
215. Id. at 1011.
216. Brief of Appellant at 13, Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir.
1992) (No. 89-2863); see also Reply Brief for Appellant at 5-6; Appellants' Response to
Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 4, 6.
217. Brief of Appellant at 20-23. The plaintiffs also contended that the police were
obliged to arrest Fields and Gregory. Id. at 29-31. As a matter of federal constitutional
law, this does not necessarily follow. There were a variety of different ways in which the
police could have responded that would not have left Gregory and Fields alone in the
unattended car.
218. Brief of Appellees at 7-8, 15, Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir.
1992) (No. 89-2863).
219. Given the grievous injuries suffered by the plaintiffs, it is an important part of the
defendants' narrative to identify some blameworthy actor. Consistent with a narrative
that begins after the arrival at the police station, the defendants allocated blame to
Gregory and also to Turner, who allegedly left the keys in the car. This is the version
adopted by the majority of the court.
220. Appellees' Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 6-9.
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case of action that created a new risk of harm. Having done so, it
was a simple matter to distinguish DeShaney and uphold liability. 22 '
The en banc court returned to the view that the case was about inac-
tion and concluded that DeShaney did indeed control.
Because DeShaney bars constitutional liability for state inaction
where the plaintiff is not in custody, 222 noncustodial plaintiffs
should not characterize their cases as unseen actor cases. For much
the same reason, defendants should seek to recharacterize the cases
as unseen state actor claims. Thus, the struggle to define the narra-
tive in Gregory is a common feature of indirect harm cases.
There are unseen actor narratives that cannot readily be trans-
formed into other more winnable stories. For example, given the
facts presented in the model street assault case, it is difficult to see
how the case could be viewed as anything other than a street assault
case. 2 " Similarly, if in fact there were no individuals who were con-
cerned about Joshua DeShaney, then the case could not be re-
formed as a reliance case.
Some of these immutable unseen actor narratives present compel-
ling cases for liability. Again, consider the street assault case. It is
unacceptable for an officer charged with protecting public safety to
sit idly by when she could safely intervene and save a citizen from
grave injury.22 4 Similarly, if a social worker had entered the
DeShaney home at a moment when Joshua was in grave need of
medical assistance and then recorded the situation and departed
without taking steps to obtain or provide that assistance, her con-
duct would be deplorable. And yet, under current law, there would
be no constitutional claim in these circumstances. 22 5
221. See Gregory v. City of Rogers, 921 F.2d 750 (8th Cir. 1990), vacated and withdrawn
for reh'g en bane, 939 F.2d 524 (8th Cir. 1991), and opinion on reh 'g en bane, 974 F.2d 1006
(8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1265 (1993).
222. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
223. This contrasts with DeShaney where, at least in theory, it is easy to see how the
case could be transformed. Additional actors whose behavior is altered by the state
conduct must be located and included in the story.
224. See Sam H. Verhovek, Infected Nurse Wins $5.4 Million From New York State in AIDS
Suit, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1992, at AI (reporting trial court order in case where prison
guards stood by and failed to intervene in struggle between HIV-positive prisoner and
nurse, during the course of which nurse was exposed to and infected with HIV; the
article reports that the ruling was notable "for the anger expressed by thejudge... who
said testimony ... left him convinced that the incident could easily have been avoided if
the prison guards had done their duty rather than standing in the hallway observing the
thrashing"); see alsoJack Hopkins, State Must Pay Rape Victim $204, 752, SEATrLE P. I., Feb.
25, 1992, at A-I.
225. It may be quite unlikely that an officer or a social worker would behave in this
fashion. One reason for such neglect might be bias against the victim. In that instance,
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These are cases in which there should be liability. 226 There are
three different routes by which this result could be achieved. First,
federal courts could carve out an exception to DeShaney that would
permit liability in a limited number of unseen actor cases. This
could be achieved by building on the case law that currently permits
imposition of constitutional liability on police officers who fail to in-
tervene while their colleagues use unlawful force against an individ-
ual.227 The legal basis for liability in these circumstances remains
unclear. Although there are cases affirming bystander liability after
DeShaney, they do not discuss the applicability of DeShaney to the par-
ticular claim for failure to protect. A careful analysis of these cases
and the circumstances they present might lead to the development
of an exception to DeShaney that would permit liability in some un-
seen actor cases.
A second path to liability in some unseen actor cases is through
state tort law. Although in some states there may be many barriers,
including statutory or common law sovereign immunity, this has
proven a viable route in some instances. 228 One substantial advan-
tage of state tort law, where it is an option, is that proof of simple
negligence might suffice.
Finally, liability could be imposed through legislation. In order to
create a contained exception, such legislation might provide that
where a state actor or agency is under an obligation to provide pro-
tection to another, and where the actor fails to exercise reasonable
care in the discharge of that obligation, a person injured by such
conduct shall have a cause of action.2 29
The rules governing liability in unseen actor cases are currently in
need of reform. DeShaney is too restrictive and forecloses liability in
cases where it is warranted. Given further exploration and develop-
there might be an alternative basis for constitutional liability under the Equal Protection
Clause.
226. My instincts as a lawyer tell me that these are winnable cases, despite the legal
obstacles noted here. Certainly I would take such a case if it walked in the door. The
results of cases litigated under state law also suggest that juries and judges are
sympathetic to the victims in these cases. See Hopkins, supra note 224; Verhovek, supra
note 224.
227. See cases cited supra note 113.
228. See Division of Corrections, Dep't of Health & Social Servs. v. Neakok, 721 P.2d
1121 (Alaska 1986) (imposing liability for failure to supervise parolee); Taggart v. State,
822 P.2d 243 (Wash. 1992) (en banc) (imposing liability for failing to supervise parolee);
see also sources cited supra note 224.
229. If a legislature wanted to impose a standard of care more similar to that found in
other § 1983 cases, it could provide for liability only where the defendant acts with
reckless disregard for another or where the defendant fails to exercise professional
judgment.
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ment, the three approaches that I have sketched above offer the
most practical remedies to this problem.
4. Liability in an Absent State Actor Case
Under currently prevailing law, there is no constitutional liability
in an absent state actor case. It is well-accepted that the police are
not insurers of public safety, to be held strictly liable when a citizen
is injured by crime. Thus, in a typical absent state actor case, there
is no liability at all. Where, however, the absence of state assistance
is attributable to negligent or reckless actions of police supervisors
or individual officers, liability may be permissible under state law.
For example, in a case where the plaintiff is attacked, a witness calls
the police, the police are unable to respond promptly because of
departmental decisions that have left no patrol officers in that sector
of the city, and the most serious injury to the plaintiff is inflicted
after the time at which the police would have arrived had they uti-
lized a standard patrolling pattern, the plaintiff might allege that the
negligent or reckless staffing decisions caused the harm to her. Sim-
ilarly, where the inability to respond can be attributed to the negli-
gent or reckless actions of an individual officer, there may be a state
law tort claim.230 There is no federal claim because the police ac-
tion did not create the danger, nor did it increase the risk to the
victim.2 31 Instead, it prevented her from being protected. There
will be no claim for a due process violation. 232
5. Liability in an Absent Institution Case
If a town decides to have no police force or not to create a child
protective services agency, there is presently no remedy through
constitutional litigation.2 33 If the absence of the state institution is a
230. These plaintiffs will face very difficult problems regarding proof of causation-
that absent the asserted reckless conduct, an officer would have responded in time to
prevent some harm and, having responded, would have been able to prevent the harm.
231. This is different from a reliance case because there is no evidence that anyone-
neither the victim nor the witness-relied on the response of the police in determining
their own actions.
232. Where the absence of the police can be shown to result from actions motivated
by impermissible bias, there could be an Equal Protection Clause challenge. For
example, Reginald Denny and three other individuals injured in the riots that followed
the first verdict in the Rodney King trials have filed a § 1983 claim against the City of
Los Angeles for failing to provide adequate police protection. The critical assertion in
their case is that the city discriminated against poor neighborhoods in the provision of
police services. Jonathan M. Moses, Legal Beat: Riot Victims' Suits, WALL ST. J., May 4,
1993, at B6.
233. But see Heyman, supra note 109, at 554-66 (arguing that Fourteenth Amendment
was intended to impose affirmative duty on state to protect citizens from private
violence); Robin West, Toward an Abolitionist Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 94
[Vol. 62
SNAKE PITS
problem, then the solution must be found through the political
process.
The failure of the courts to provide relief in this instance is not as
troubling as the refusal to provide relief in unseen actor cases. In
the event a political decision is made not to provide a particular ser-
vice, it is at least possible that the affected populations can organize
to change this policy. By contrast, in the unseen actor case, the ob-
vious political decision-to have a police force or a child protective
services agency-has already been made. The problem is that the
existing state institution is not functioning properly in the instances
giving rise to the complaints. This is a much more difficult problem
to address through the political process because it does not obvi-
ously affect as many people as the decision not to establish the insti-
tution at all.
VI. CONCLUSION
Section 1983 liability in cases of indirect harm remains a subject
of much dispute and confusion. A review of the cases at first dis-
closes an array of disparate approaches relying on apparently con-
flicting--or, at best, unrelated-legal rules. As I have shown,
however, closer examination and analysis can yield a more coherent
picture. Indirect harm cases can be divided into five categories-
snake pit, reliance, unseen actor, unseen institution, and absent in-
stitution-each of which I have exemplified with model cases. Every
indirect harm case can be analogized to at least one model case, and
thus can be identified with at least one category.
This is not to say that the process of categorization is simple,
straightforward, or determinate. Indeed, categorization of a case
frequently is-and should be-one of the most significant contested
issues in litigation. One of the goals of this Article is to bring to the
fore the importance of the categorization of a case in order to direct
the attention of courts, commentators, and litigators to that critical
stage in the legal process. Once a case has been categorized, the
legal analysis is simplified. Each category is governed by a uniform
legal analysis, each of which I have discussed above. Categorization
of a case determines the appropriate legal analysis to be applied to
it.
Under current law, there is a sound basis for liability in snake pit
and reliance cases. Liability in unseen actor cases is precluded by
W. VA. L. REV. 111 (1991) (arguing that plain meaning of Fourteenth Amendment is
that no state may deny to any citizen the protection of its criminal and civil laws against
private violence and violation).
1994]
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DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, the Supreme
Court's most recent major opinion in an indirect harm case. This
rule is too restrictive. I have identified three alternative routes to a
more satisfactory result. Finally, I conclude that substantive due
process liability is essentially precluded for unseen and absent insti-
tution cases. These cases are scarce, if not nonexistent, however,
and I do not find this result troubling.
Thus, I have tried to conduct a comprehensive examination of in-
direct harm cases and to provide a focused legal analysis of the lia-
bility issues presented by these cases. This project should assist
commentators, judges, and lawyers in formulating their approaches
to these difficult cases, in identifying the critical issues that must be
resolved, and in attaining appropriate resolutions of them.
As the government becomes increasingly entwined in the lives of
its citizens, indirect harm litigation continues to multiply. New cases
arise from unexpected circumstances. Indirect harm cases continu-
ally challenge us to define the limits of liability under the Due Pro-
cess Clause. This Article can be but one step on the path towards a
reasoned, equitable, and just solution to this most perplexing
problem.
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